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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a qualitative analysis of the managed care approach to delivering health
care in the Tidewater area of Virginia. The thesis begins with the development of civilian
health care as well as the history of Navy and military medicine. This is followed by the
develooment of managed care within the Department of Defense. A sociotechnical
systems approach is then used to analyze the central function of accessing health care
through the TRICARE Service Center in the Tidewater area. The analysis disclosed some
key deviations from providing the patient quick, dependable access into the military
health care system. To control these variances, the establishment of horizontal
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This thesis is an action research study concerning an
ongoing organizational change of the Tri-Services Coordinated
Care (TRICARE) program. The objectives of this thesis are to
describe the Coordinated Care/Managed Care Program, explain
the reasons that led the Department of Defense's medical
community to implement this enormous organizational change,
analyze why the military chose the Tidewater area as the site
for this program, and, most importantly, to report the
findings made during this field research.
B. RESEARCH
1. Data Collection.
Interviews were the primary means used to collect data
on the Tidewater TRICARE coordinated care program. The
interview method of collecting data was chosen because it was
determined to provide the 3t potential for gathering
qualitative data. The interviews were conducted during a one
week period in September 1993. All of the interviews lasted
about one hour. There were a total of 43 face-to-face
interviews and four telephone interviews conducted. Refer to
the figure 1 on the following page on specifics of where and
whom we interviewed.
The interviewees were selected from all over the Tidewater
area. We interviewed personnel from the three military
hospitals, all the major subordinate clinics, the TRICARE
service centers, and the TRICARE Project Office for a total of
43 interviews. There were a total of 14 interviews conducted
at the surrounding clinics: six at Boone Clinic; four at
Sewell's Point; and four at Oceana.
INTERVIEWS BY DEPARTMENT
DEPART- TRICARE MANAGED PORTSMOUTH STAFF TDTCARE TOTAL,
MENT PROJECT CARE HOSPITAL AT THE SERVICE
OFFICE OFFICE ADMINISTRA- CLINIC CENTER
TION
INTER- 7 3 4 14 15 43
VIEWS I I III_
FIGURE 1
The interviews were semi-structured which allowed the
interviewers the freedom to pursue topics they deenied
important. The interview protocol provided an introductory
statement followed by general questions about the TRICARE
program, how it affected them, and how well the program was
operating. There was some degree of directiveness once the
interview began. The interviewers asked probing descriptive
questions (i.e., asking the interviewee to describe in depth
what happened in a particular situation) and evaluative
questions (i.e., asking the interviewees' opinions regarding
specific situations). The interview protocol was evaluated
each evening during the interview week and was adjusted based
on issue discoveries made by the interviewers. After
determining what additional data was needed and where to
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obtain it, rour telephone interviews were used to pursue
supplEmental information. Telephone interviews were more
Jirective in nature than the face-to-face interviews.
Interviewees were asked direct, focused and specific
questions. The project's historical information was gleaned
from command archives and presentations. No formal or
statistical method of sampling was used to select the
interviewees. The interviews originated with managers at the
TRICARE Project Office. If someone's name came up during the
course of an interview, they became candidates for a future
interview. They were then called, and an appointment for an
interview was set. This process repeated itself with each
subsequent interview branching off the previous. Each
interview was tape-recorded while the interviewer took notes
to ensure answers were recorded verbatim. Each interview was
later transcribed by the interviewers and indexed both
alphabetically and by location.
2. Data Analysis.
Data analysis was a continuous process. Data collected
from these interviews was analyzed using qualitative methods.
The first step in the analysis was to read each interview to
determine the major issues identified by the interviewees. As
the interviews were read, topic areas began to develop and
were immediaLely written down. Following the first reading,
we discussed our ideas among ourselves with a tape recorder on
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as well as taking notes. This process allowed us to generate
new ideas as well as permanently storing ideas for future
analysis. We then reread the interviews for better clarity
and understanding. Topic categories were then established,
and the data was sorted into each category. The last step in
the data analysis was to write, critique, and rewrite the
text. Tfis process was repeated until a finished product was
achieved.
The field data was collected in thu Tidewater area mainly
through oral interviews. Historical data on the TRICARE
program was collected from command archives. This data was
studied using qualitative methods of analysis as well as
organizational change management models.
C. BACKGROUND
The cost of health care in the military has been
increasing beyond what can be covered with the budget
authorizations. In the last five years the military medical
communities have sought to develop innovative ways to provide
quality health care at a lower cost. On October 1, 1991, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense published a memorandum
titled "Strengthening the Medical Functions of the Department
of Defense." In this memorandum, he stated that "with
increasingly tight constraints on resources available for the
national defense, the Department must aggressively pursue
actions to execute its vital missions more effectively,
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including its medical mission." Also in this memorandum he
directs the implementation of several organizational changes,
one specifically being a Coordinated Care Program (CCP). As
a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the
TRICARE program in the Tidewater area of Virginia.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There were no specific interview questions as we entered
the field to conduct this study. This study was intended to
be freely structured in order to remain receptive to current
issues related to the TRICARE program. Thus, the broad
questions we took to the field were:
1. What lead the military to change the way they provide
health care and implement the Coordinated Care Program?
2. Why did the military medical community choose the
Tidewater area as the site for the Coordinated Care
Program?
3. What were the critical change issues that surfaced during
the implementation of the Tidewater TRICARE program?
4. What specific techniques were used to manage and
facilitate the change from the traditional delivery of
health care to the managed care/coordinated care system.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Following the introduction chapter, the thesis is
organized into four chapters. Chapter II discusses the
history of health care in the public sector and culminates
with the delivery of health care in the military, specifically
the Navy. Chapter III contains information on the Department
of Defense's shift towards joint operations in services, and
SIln Illllilllnnml Il lll~5
how this has lead to successful programs like TRICARE. We
will describe the TRICARP program and the issues that created
this immense reorganization. In chapter IV, a sociotechnical
approach is used to analyze the information flow between the
patient, TRICARE's consolidated booking system, and the
provider. Chapter V completes the thesis with conclusions,
recommendations and a thesis summary. Conclusions address
the key variances that occur in the information flow between
the TRICARE Service Center and the clinics in the Tidewater
area. Recommendations address several ways to control the key
variances. Additional research questions are also addressed
for follow-on research studies with regard to the TRICARE
Demonstration Project.
6
II. HISTORY OF MEDICINE
A. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN HEALTH CARE
This section will provide a chronological account of the
development of health care within the civilian sector from the
1700's to the present. It will show the cyclical pattern of
medical emphasis from family medicine to specialization back
to family practice. The current need for general
practitioners, or "family physicians" is shown by the
increasing use of managed care or Health Maintenance
Organizations. This idea will be discussed later in this
chapter in detail. The preponderance of historical
information contained in this section is taken from The Social
Transformation of American Medicine by Paul Starr.
1. 1700's:THE FAMILY'S ROLE IN MEDICINE
In Eighteenth Century America, a physician practiced
medicine in an extremely competitive environment, competing
not only with other physicians but also with the family
institution. Although a doctor's ambition was to develop a
strong reputation and a close relationship with his patients,
the family in early American society was the focal point of
social and economic life. Women had the responsibility to
care for the ill in her family. This family focus made it
difficult for physicians to establish themselves as necessary
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agents to heal the sick. As the years went on, medical books
and journals were published and circulated around town to
assist women in diagnosing and preventing disease. Books such
as Domestic Medicine, written by William Buchan, set forth in
layman's terms information on current diseases and medical
advice on preventive medicine. These types of books
challenged the authority of medical professionals by alleging
that families could care for themselves.
America, at this time, was a rapidly changing and
expanding society. Professional physicians wanted to
establish an elite and distinct society of professional
doctors, similar to that of England. In England, physicians
had specific requirements they had to meet to practice
medicine. Physicians in America also wanted to establish
boundaries around the practice of medicine to prevent laymen
from engaging in such endeavors. These boundaries included
the requirement to obtain a degree in medicine and a license
to practice. Unfortunately, the boundaries between profession
and trade, physician and layman that so assiduously preserved
the profession in Britain were not as clear in America.
Gradually, Americans who were seriously interested in
practicing medicine went to Europe for advanced medical
education, since none existed in this country. This proactive
movement towards establishing quality medical practices
motivated local governments to protect the profession with
legislative initiatives.
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One such initiative occurred in 1765 when the first
medical school was chartered at the College of Philadelphia in
Pennsylvania. Although few schools existed at this time, many
physicians hoped that by establishing medical schools in
America, they would be able to create a respected profession
similar to that of Great Britain. Initially, medical schools
offered both bachelor's and doctoral degrees in medicine, but
it soon became clear that most students graduating with a
bachelor's degree did not return for their doctorate degree.
Since most doctors felt confident practicing medicine with
only a bachelor's degree, the status and respect that might be
gained with advanced education would not be realized.
Although physicians wanted boundaries set for practicing
medicine, the American government, with its massively
expanding population, did not have the political means to
enforce many requirements.
2. 1800's:THE GROWTH OF PROFESSIONAL MEDICINE
As America grew, people's social and economic life styles
changed. The tight knit family circle once centered on a
small piece of land started to change. Family members began
moving out of the area to start a new life on their own. As
the family became more geographically separated, they lost
their close bond during times of illness. People conversely
became more dependent on the physician for medical care. The
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relationship between the doctor and his patient began to grow
strong.
At the turn of the century another change was also
starting to take form in medicine. The social distance
between the doctor and patient started increasing while the
rapport between practicing physicians grew closer. The
government finally recognized the medical profession as
legitimate, and boundaries to protect their practice were
beginning to be enforced.
Unfortunately, American hospitals at the start of the
nineteenth century were considered dangerous places to go if
you were sick. They were viewed as institutions for the
mentally ill, not the physically ill. Many felt it was safer
to stay at home with your family and wait for the family
doctor to make a house call. Consequently, hospitals were
rarely used for treatment of the sick. In addition, the
levels of medical technology were very elementary compared to
today, and most everything that could be done in a hospital
could also be done during a house call. Most people who
resided far from town did not seek out doctors for treatment
of their ills, and unless doctors made house calls, traveling
to a doctor's office could mean an entire day's work lost for
the patient. Physicians, on the other hand, made valiant
attempts to make house calls in hopes of reaching the people,
curing the sick, and providing themselves with a source of
income. Because of the time required traveling from patient
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to office to patient, physicians found it difficult to support
themselves by practicing medicine as their sole source of
income. Many local doctors were also the pharmacist, and
surgeons were often the town barber. Autobiographies of
doctors practicing medicine in the nineteenth century state
that most of their day was spent traveling along back country
roads, "half ... in the mud and the other half in the dust."
The "transportation revolution" in the mid-nineteenth
century really benefitted the practice of medicine. The
railroad brought patients into the city faster and cheaper to
be treated by the physician. Street cars used in the cities
saved valuable time for both the patient and the doctor.
Doctors usually set up their office along the street cars'
routes making access easier. This "transportation revolution"
helped physicians expand the territory that they could cover.
Finally, the telephone made its debut in the 1870s making it
easier and more affordable to reach physicians. The first
rudimentary telephone exchange on record, built in 1877,
connected the Capital Avenue Drugstore in Hartford,
Connecticut with twenty-one local doctors. Drug stores in
those days were considered message centers for doctors. This
transportation revolution also decreased indirect costs for
medical care and put care within the income range of most
people.
New technologies developed during the nineteenth century
included advances in automobiles, hard roads, telephones and
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railroads. This enabled physicians to cut travel time and
allowed them to spend more time with their patients. It also
meant less time out of a patient's busy day to visit the
doctor. Cutting transportation costs (and time) directly
raised the supply of physicians' services by increasing the
proportion of the physician's time that could be spent with
the patient.
The close of the nineteenth century saw a greater reliance
on hospitals for providing medical care. Urban growth led to
higher property taxes, and consequently, people in or near the
city moved into smaller homes and apartments. Smaller places
to live made it more difficult to care for the acutely ill at
home. Many times, there was simply not enough room. However,
the dangers of infection in general hospitals because of poor
hospital hygiene led families to manage physical illness at
home if at all possible. It wasn't until after the Civil War
that hospital hygiene improved.
3. 1900's: THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGED CARE
As America entered the twentieth century, society
transformed from a predominantly agricultural economy to a
manufacturing economy. The manufacturing economy gave rise to
big businesses over small, family-owned operations causing a
shift in focus from individual orientation to that of
institutional domination. [Ref l:p. 31
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During the last fifty years, society in every developed
country has become a society of institution. Every major
task whether performance or health care, education or
protection of the environment, the pursuit of new
knowledge or defense, is today being entrusted to big
organizations, designed for perpetuity and managed by
their own management. [Ref 1:p. 3]
Simultaneously, in the medical arena, a historical
transition from generalist to specialist occurred. This
transition set the seed for corporate management of medica±
care. Specialized medicine quickly began to unfold during
World War II. With the surge of new technology, physicians
started to specialize in certain areas of medicine. There was
an increasing emphasis on medical training and facilities, and
physicians released from military service were taking
residency in various specialties. At the end of World War II,
practicing specialists started to flood the market as 100,000
medical personnel (not all physicians) were released from
active duty during the post war downsizing. By 1966, almost
70% of all practicing physicians called themselves specialists
leaving 30% as generalists.
Specialists began to practice in groups instead of working
on their own. The costs of providing medical care, advances
in technology, scientific evolution, and other economic forces
were the main catalyst for this shift. Physicians would
purchase expensive equipment as a group rather than practice
on their own and bear all the expense.
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Managed medical care has been developing for the last 60
years, and group practice evolved into popular marketable
entities called Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) and
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) . These organizations,
growing successfully on group payment and preventive medical
care, inspired several other prepaid group practice plans to
evolve. From 1930-1960 these organizations prospered but not
without opposition from organized medicine (such as the AMA).
Even when direct service prepaid plans were controlled by
physicians, the AMA disapproved of them as a form of unethical
contract practice. In fact, the AMA, in 1937 opposed the
Group Health Association in Washington D.C. so vehemently that
they fought it in court by charging that it violated the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. When court action failed, they
threatened reprisals against any doctor who worked for the
plan, prevented them from obtaining consultations and
referrals and succeeded in persuading every hospital in the
District to deny them admitting privileges. This succeeded in
cutting off group members of the cooperative from hospital
care.
The Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Program, originated in
1942, is considered by far the largest, most widely
distributed and best known HMO in the country. [Ref l:p. 4]
An HMO is a delivery system with a mission to provide high
quality health and medical services at a competitive price.
Competition is the key variable in the mission statement. The
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basic principles of management; planning, organizing,
directing, controlling and coordinating all lend themselves to
carrying out the stated mission through the use of alternative
provider systems such as HMO's and PPO's. [Ref l:p. 7] The
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), by definition, is
slightly different than a Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO). A PPO is "a contractual arrangement between
professional and/or institutional health care pro'viders and
employers, insurance carriers or third-party administrators to
provide health care services to a defined population at
established fees." [Ref l:p. 51 HMO's and PPO's represent
a competitive form of bureaucratic organization in medical
care. [Ref 2:p. 27] By mid 1979, there were 217 HMO's
operating across the nation with a total enrollment of 7.9
million people. This figure had doubled in size since 1970.
Clearly, a primary reason that HMO's have been so successful
is that physicians have been able to accept some financial
risk - the financial risk associated with providing medical
care and services to a group of subscribers. Both profits and
losses are shared by all the physicians.
As we move toward the end of the twentieth century, there
is a growing concern that there are too many specialists and
not enough generalists to provide adequate care for the nation
at a reasonable cost. There is a strong consensus that
primary care physicians are the foundation to an effective
health care system. Current interest among physicians to
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practice primary care is very low. One possible reason is
purely financial; another is related to status. Now almost
all young internists have their ambitions tied to becoming a
specialist. The percentage of practicing primary care
physicians is a staggering 32%. That leaves 68% of the
physicians practicing in a specialized field. [Ref 3:p. 380]
In contrast to other industrialized nations, the
percentage of specialist and generalist is balanced at 50%.
Health indicators show that in comparing costs, other
countries do as well or better in providing the care at lower
cost. Additionally, the percentage of physicians graduating
from U.S. medical schools who are declaring generalist fields
has drastically declined from 36% in 1982 to 14% in 1992.
This is significant to analyze since successful models for an
effective national managed health care system requires a
ration of 35% specialists and a 65% generalist physician
distribution (see Figures 2 and 3). [Ref 3:p. 380]
The 1980's ended with the nation realizing the need to
develop awareness and incentives for physicians to practice
primary care, in general, and family care practice in
particular. Major issues pertinent to family practice in 1989
include passage of Medicare physician payment reform and the
development of student interest initiatives. These
initiatives give financial incentive to students to become
general practitioners, family physicians, etc. [Ref 4:p 2643]
As the 1990's begin to unfold, it becomes even more
16
PROJECTED HEALTH CARE COSTS
FOR FY-93 ($16B)
CHAMPUS - $3.51 (21.9%)
//
DIRECT CARE - $12.5B (78.1/%)
FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT
CARE COSTS FOR FY-93 ($12,5B)
GERNERAL COSTS - $38 (24.0%)
MEDICAL CARE (76.0%) -
FIGURE 3
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critical to promote student interest in family practice. This
is particularly important as our society places greater
emphasis on continuity of care, preventive medicine and health
promotion. Unfortunately, 14% of graduating "generalist"
medical students is far too few to meet expected demands for
their services. Making the situation even worse, nearly
24,000 family and general practice physicians are now over 55
years of age and will retire in the near future. [Ref 4:p.
2643]
As we attempt to find ways to increase accessibility to
care, reduce medical costs and continue to maintain high
quality of care; increasing primary care physicians can be the
one solution. David Meltzer in his article Are Generalists
the Answer for Primary Care identifies that primary care
physicians-can result in fewer emergent hospital admissions,
shorter lengths of stay, lower medical costs, a wider access
to care and overall greater patient satisfaction. Another
solution could by to increase the specialists' care to include
primary care. Specialists' could then provide primary
care/family care and treat specific patient problems as well.
This would reduce the number of referrals, decrease multiple
workups and ultimately improve the continuity and coordination
of care. Expanding primary care to specialists can be
accomplished in less time than would training a new generation
of generalists. [Ref 5: p. 1714]
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It is clear that America needs to provide better primary
care for its citizens. This is the objective behind President
Clinton's new national health plan. As we collectively
improve the nation's health care system, why not cultivate
more specialists to practice primary care instead of training
more physicians to be generalists.
President Clinton has launched a nationwide effort to find
an acceptable new balance of competing public demands to
reinvent health care in ways that provide somewhat less
freedom for patients and doctors with more cost control while
still providing quality care. Cost for health spending has
been on the rise for at least four decades. Between 1965 and
1991 health spending has risen from 5.9 to 13.2 percent of the
Gross Domestic Product. During the same time frame, health
care costs have gone from 2.6 percent to 16 percent of federal
outlays, and if no changes occur, could reach 25% by the year
2000. [Ref 6:p. 31]
The Department of Defense has also begun to pursue
innovative approaches ,o reinvent their health care delivery
system. There are various satellite projects ongoing
throughout the United States such as the TRICARE Demonstration
Project in Virginia. Reinventing the delivery of health care
is a major undertaking for any organization especially the
military. The remainder of this chapter will provide a brief
history in chronological order of the practice of medicine in
the military. It will focus primarily on the Navy's Military
19
Health Service System (MHSS). The chapter will conclude with
a description of the TRICARE Demonstration Project.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY HEALTHCARE
This section takes a looK at the development of medical
practice first in the Navy and then within the Department of
Defense (DOD). The history of Navy medicine begins in 1775
with the commissioning of the Navy's first warships. This
discussion will develop into current trends in medical
practice within the entire DOD.
1. History of Navy Medicine.
Navy medicine has progressed in much the same way as it
has in the civilian sector. The mission of today's Navy
Medical Department is to "ensure the health of our Navy and
Marine Corps personnel so that they are physically and
mentally ready to carry out their worldwide mission."
[Ref 7:p. 2] Today's Military Health Services System (MHSS)
is a large, complex organization. It consists of over 400,000
personnel in the active duty, reserve and civilian workforce.
It operates over 143 hospitals and medical centers and more
than 800 medical and dental clinics all over the world. Total
eligible beneficiaries total over 9 million people.
[Ref 8:p. 22)
Ever since 1775 when the Continental Congress commissioned
its first warships, the Navy has provided medical support for
its sailors and marines. At that time, a civilian was
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appointed as ship's surgeon and was authorized for service on
the ship. They were professional gentlemen, not officers and
not sailors. Surgeons and surgeon's mates were hired simply
for the duration of a cruise and discharged on its completion.
They were tasked with only the immediate treatment of disease
and injury. Their main goal was to keep as many crewmen as
possible battle ready. [Ref 9:p. 10] In fact, between 1775
and 1842 there was no formal organization to sponsor and
promote Navy medicine. In 1822, the first standards were
established for entrance into the medical corps. Courses of
instruction in naval hygiene and military surgery were also
developed for newly commissioned medical officers. It wasn't
until 1842 that the Navy was reorganized and The Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) established.
Prior to 1842, Navy medical personnel had limited status
within the organization but no rank. Physicians began
requesting what was called assimilated rank. They wanted to
be commissioned as Navy officers with the rank of either
Assistant Surgeon, Passed Assistant Surgeon, Surgeon or Fleet
Surgeon. This proposal was extremely unpopular with the line
-Eficers who felt that their status as military officers was
being jeopardized. In 1846, the Secretary of the Navy issued
an order providing for assimilated rank. From then on,
medical officers would rank with line offices of comparable
seniority, although their rank titles would be different.
[Ref 9:p. 14-15]
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The 1900's brought great organizational change within the
medical department. Increased attention was paid to requiring
inoculations for small pox and typhoid. Postgraduate and
specialization training were instituted and greater attention
was paid to infectious disease control and sanitation. In
1908 the Nurse Corps was established and in 1912 the Dental
Corps. In 1940, with the authorization of a "two-ocean" Navy,
the need arose for greater focus on logistics and medical
supply, medical mobility, and casualty evacuation. Mobile
field hospitals with anywhere from 10 to 3,000 beds were
developed and staffed. Hospital ships were made to be as
fully functional as a large-shore based facility. All major
U.S. Naval vessels were embarked with full medical capability
and even small vessels carried at least one corpsman on
independent duty. The great advances in combat casualty care
are clearly shown by their effects on survival: at least half
of all men wounded in battle prior to World War I died from
their injuries; during World War II, 98% of the wounded
recovered. [Ref 9:p. 3]
During World War II the Medical Department grew from
13,000 to 170,000, but by July of 1946, 100,000 were
discharged. One of the most important Navy medical initiative
of the time was the establishment of the Medical Service Corps
in 1947. With the addition of nuclear weapons to many
countries' arsenals, important advances were made in the areas
of radiation exposure and health surveillance programs.
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Increased priority was also given to defense against injury by
chemical, biological and radiological wartare agents.
The attack of North Korea across the 38th parallel in 1950
brought new difficulties for the medical department. After
World War II, the Medical Department found itself preoccupied
with peacetime hospital practice. An amendment to the
Selective Service Act was necessary to provide enough
physicians and dentists to support combat forces in Korea.
Tri-service coordination was used to procure medical equipment
and supplies and provide more effective operational and
logistics support. Casualty survival rate again increased
with the ability to provide a ready supply of whole blood and
blood derivatives to combat areas. With the institution of
the all volunteer military force after the Vietnam conflict,
recruiters found their pools of physician volunteers empty.
Because of this, the Armed Forces Health Professions
Scholarship Program and the School of Medicine at the
Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences were
established. During the post Vietnam exodus of physicians,
the Navy also found itself severely short of general medical
officers and had to use specialists as generalists. To
respond to the urgent need for more general medical officers
(and provide for career advancement of senior enlisted
corpsmen), the Warrant Officer Physician's Assistant Program
was established. To enhance physician retention, promotions
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were accelerated and special pay was increased. [Ref 7: pp.
4-5]
2. Current Trends.
Ever since the 1800's the Medical Department's funding has
come from appropriations from the federal budget. Today, free
health care for active duty military personnel is, by law, a
right. Therefore, all care provided to active duty personnel
comes through the direct care system (military treatment
facilities) or is paid for by it. Dependents of active duty
personnel are a3 so eligible for direct care but only when such
care is available. When care is not available, some
beneficiaries can use the Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). Those eligible to use
CHAMPUS include active duty dependents and retirees under age
65, their dependents and survivors (active duty members are
not eligible for CHAMPUS). Under CHAMPUS guidelines, if
direct care is not available, beneficiaries are directed to
see civilian providers with most of the costs being covered by
CHAMPUS funds.
Defense health care costs are rising fast. In 1984, DoD
spent approximately $7.2 billion on military healthcare and in
1990 just over $14 billion. In 1993, DOD will spend well over
$16 billion on military health care. Twelve and one-half
billion dollars will be spend on direct care. Direct care
costs include pay and benefits of the military and civilian
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health care providers and the costs for operating and
maintaining the direct care system. The remaining $3.5
billion will be consumed by CHAMPUS. Nine and a half billion
of the direct care dollars ($12.5 Billion) are directly
related to providing peacetime medical care to beneficiaries,
and the remaining expenses are general costs associated with
maintaining a medical establishment such as military
construction or costs of having a medical supply war reserve
(see Figures 4 and 5).
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts that, if no
changes in military health care policies take place, health
care costs will continue to rise over the next few years
despite the drawdown in forces. Even if active-duty personnel
are reduced to 1.4 million in 1997, peacetime health costs are
still predicted to rise from $9.5 billion in 1993 to $11.6
billion.
During the current drawdown of military forces, more than
24 military hospitals are shutting their doors as the bases
they are attached to close (this does not include clinics or
small medical facilities). As direct care becomes less
available as the number of Military Treatment Facilities (MTF)
decrease, more beneficiaries are being driven into the
civilian community for care. This is causing a direct impact
on the number of CHAMPUS claims being filed. The number of
CHAMPUS users has dropped from 6 million in 1988 to 5.9













in force and the associated decrease in military dependents.
Although the number of users has decreased, the number of
claims filed has increased by over 65% (see Figure 6). [Ref
11:p. 141
NO. OF BENEFICIARIES vs. NO. OF CHAMPUS CLAIMS





*reflects claims processed through June 30,1993.
FIGURE 6
One way to control these rising CHAMPUS costs is to reduce
the number of eligible beneficiaries. A second, more feasible
approach, is to decrease the need to use civilian healthcare
providers by improving the availability of care in existing
military MTF's. This would involve a new way of managing
military health care and was the catalyst for the DOD's
Coordinated Care Program (CCP).
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGED CARE IN DOD
A. INTRODUCTION.
With the epilogue of the Cold War comes a new security
strategy for the United States. This strategy requires all
military services to join together and work as a cohesive
group to conduct a new variety of contingency operations. The
services need to understand that in order to meet the military
challenges of the future, a joint strategy is imperative; a
strategy that emanates inter-service cooperation.
Consequently, joint ingenuity and action will be essential.
Current U.S. military doctrine addresses the need to focus
on a variety of threats involving more numerous, less capable
enemy forces. This is a vast change from the long standing
doctrine which focused on a single superpower (primarily the
former Soviet Union). With the active drawdown of U.S.
military forces, the services must now be able to accomplish
their missions with smaller forces and fewer bases.
Each service will be required to fight as part of adhoc
coalitions or to work with traditional partners outside
existing alliance lines. In addition, mission
requirements will be far more complex and diverse, running
the gamut from disaster relief, humanitarian relief,
nation assistance, and peacekeeping to forced-entry
operations and high-intensity armored warfare all in a
single theater of operations-all at the same time. [Ref
12:p. 56]
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To compound these new mission challenges, all service
departments are being given less money with which to operate
(including the medical departments). With this in mind,
highly trained forces, successfully operating at the lowest
possible cost will be the military's key to success in meeting
the needs of the nation's security.
This chapter will address three issues. The first gives
a background of past and current trends in the strategy and
mission of the Department of Defense and its current policy
promoting joint operations. This discussion will include, but
will not be limited to, military operations. It will also
explore the emerging joint strategies and policies within the
Department of Defense concerning health care and the operation
of military treatment facilities.
B. BACKGROUND.
1. Joint Operations in Military Departments.
For the past 45 years military joint contingency
operations were not conducted on a routine basis. Since the
end of the Korean War, each military service has had clearly
defined responsibilities and the strategic focus of each was
explicitly recognized. The National Security Act of 1948
clearly spelled out each service's role - to man, train and
equip forces to operate on land (Department of the Army),
operate on and from the sea and conduct land operations
essential to Naval campaigns (Department of the Navy) and
29
conduct offensive and defensive air operations (Department of
the Air Force).
During the Cold War, the services developed habitual
relationships with each other primarily due to the
traditional, single strategic focus aimed at the European
theater. It was then a predictable world of distinct threats
and clear cut missions. A generation of soldiers, sailors,
Marines and airmen became accustomed to the scenario of war
a~ainst the Soviet Union. Most all efforts and training were
centered on this Cold War posture. Navy officers knew the sea
lanes of the North Atlantic inside and out. Likewise, Army
and Air Force officers found little change in war plans by
being assigned to the same bases in Europe over and over
again.
Compared to the traditional Cold War, the current threat
is not as clear cut. The 1993 National Military Strategy of
the United States sums it up best.
For most of the past 45 years the primary focus of our
national military strategy has been containment of the
Soviet Union and its communist ideology -- we met that
challenge successfully. Over the short span of the past
3 years, the Berlin Wall fell; the Warsaw Pact dissolved;
Germany reunified; democracy took hold in Eastern Europe
and grew stronger in Latin America; and international
coalition successfully reversed Iraqi aggression; and the
Soviet Union ceased to exist as communism collapsed as an
ideology and as a way of life. . . . Future threats to
U.S. interests are inherent in the uncertainty and
instability of a rapidly changing world.
-Gen Colin L. Powell, Chairman, JCS
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The current U.S. military strategy calls for a focus on a
more diverse, flexible strategy. U.S. military leaders are
actively pursuing innovative concepts that promote inter-
service cooperation. "K...From The Sea" is one such example.
The white paper, signed by Admiral Frank B. Kelso II (Chief of
Naval Operations) and General Carl E. Mundy (Commandant of the
Marine Corps) charts out the Navy's new strategic concept for
the 21st Century. Joint Pub 1, titled "Joint Warfare of the
Armed Forces," specifically outlines the DOD's current
guidance on joint operations as follows:
Joint Pub 1 guides the joint action of the Armed Forces of
the United States, presenting concepts molding those Armed
Forces into the most effective joint fighting force.
Service troops are being employed more and more under joint
force commanders. Recently, Operations Just Cause and Desert
Storm have shown that American forces can work jointly and be
truly successful. Services have constructed joint committees
to foster inter-service cooperation and eliminate barriers to
joint inter-operability.
Unfortunately, habitual relationships that develop between
individuals and groups can cause difficulties when those
individuals or groups are asked to work outside their normal
relationships. The U.S. military is no exception. Old habits
are hard to break, and getting ships, planes, tanks and most
importantly, service men and women to make the force work in
joint and combined operations cannot happen overnight.
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Contingency and daily operations with various pieces of each
service, molded together should be the standard and not the
exception. To work jointly and effectively, the services
need to capitalize on three key concepts: Trust, Teamwork and
Training. These three ingredients will bear the fruits of
victory in today's ever changing world of political and
economic turmoil. Once these three principles have been deep-
seated, an innovative balance of service capabilities can be
built and tailored to any given conflict that requires
decisive power to be successful. [Ref 12:p. 56]
Additionally, with the downsizing of the military and
fewer defense dollars to go around, the services can
accomplish their respective missions and national objectives
collectively at a lower cost. Innovation can ',reed success
that is also affordable. These successes brought on by trust,
teamwork and training not only serve the combat arms but can
serve the military medical community as well.
2. Joint Operations in the Medical Community.
The cost of health care in the military has been
increasing beyond what can be covered within budget
constraints.
Military medical costs have risen twice as fast as any
other military cost. One main reason: the armed forces
and the Veteran Affairs having to pay increasingly larger
amounts to private health-care providers now being used to
supplement in-house military care. [Ref 13:p. 45]
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There are three factors causing an increase in the use of
civilian providers. These are: (1) military hospital
closures, (2) decreasing hospital budgets, (3) and decreasing
hospital staff. These three factors have caused access to
direct care services to become severely limited. As a result,
the military is being compelled to apply the joint principles
of trust, teamwork and training to develop innovative ways to
provide accessible, quality health care at affordable costs.
One of the biggest changes in the last 25 years to effect
health care delivery was the adoption of the all volunteer
force. Prior to the 1970's, the military was composed
predominantly of single men and women. Institution of the all
volunteer force brought a much larger number of married
members. This resulted in an increased numbers of dependent
beneficiaries. Along with this trend came an increase in the
number of beneficiaries retiring from service during and after
World War II and the Korean war. With the Reagan
administration came a dramatic increase in the size of the
military force and a corresponding increase in health care
costs (more people = more health care required).
a. CHAMPUS.
The Civilian Health and Medical Program for the
Uniform Services (CHAMPUS) was introduced in the 1950's.
Initially, CHAMPUS costs were relatively low because most
beneficiaries were active duty and could be cared for using
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military direct care facilities. As the years went on, and
the number of bereficiaries (specifically active duty
dependents and retirees) began to incrrase, demand for medical
care began to rise beyond the capacity of the military
facilities. Up until 1987 referrals by military medical
commands to the civilian community under CHAMPUS were paid by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Consequently,
the military medical department reither incurred the direct
costs associated with referring their patients to the civilian
community nor saw the financial impact of it. As a result,
the OSD had to request from Congress additional funds each
year to cover outstanding CHAMPUS bills. [Ref 14:p. 10] In
1988 Congress shifted responsibility for funding and paying
CHAMPUS expenditures from OSD to each military service's
medical department. Each service would receive annual CHAMPUS
funding and be held responsible to live within their budgets
and pay their own bills.
As a result of this change in fiscal policy, the military
medical community was compelled to develop innovative
approaches to providing quality health care while
simultaneously bringing escalating medical costs under
control. Since 1988, the medical departments have been
experimenting with different programs to solve this problem.
The nost successful program implemented to date is the joint
coordinated "managed care" program. The goal of this program
is to integrate all health care services and improve acc-ss to
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high quality, cost-effective care. This "managed care"
program works effectively because it weaves the three key
ingredients, trust, teamwork and training into the thrze
medical pillars of high quality, accessibility, and reduced
cost.
b. Trust, Teamwork and Training.
Trust: The medical departments of each service have
begun to trust each other in providing quality care to their
service's beneficiaries. Working jointly is creating this
trusting bond between the services.
Teamwork: Military services working together, side
by side is not a new concept in the medical community.
"Purple suitors" is a common name for people working in a
joint environment such as medical technicians working with
other services in military facilities. As the military
medical services begin working together, each service is
opening their doors for other service members and their
dependents. Joint operations and teamwork are almost
synonymous.
Training: Services training together in operations
like Desert Storm and Restore Hope are recent examples of
successful teamwork. The Tri-Services Coordinated Care
(TRICARE) in the Tidewater area of Virginia is a perfect
example of a successful medical treatment and training program
consisting of the Army, Navy and Air Force working together to
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provide quality care at lower costs and increasing
accessibility to all military beneficiaries.
C. TRICARE HISTORY
The first meeting of the Joint Services/Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) Health Affairs Task
Force for Coordinated Care Operations took place in June 1990.
This group specifically addressed the need to establish a
managed care system in the Tidewater area. In September 1990,
the initial meeting of the tri-service MTF commanders (MTF
Commanders at Langley AF Base, Fort Eustis and Portsmouth
Naval Hospital) took place to discuss the concept of
establishing a coordinated cachement area management project
in Tidewater.
Although this is the first truly tri-service coordinated
care effort, there have been several other programs aimed at
controlling growing health care costs. One of these is
Cachement Area Management. Within the 1988 CHAMPUS
reallocation, Congress authorized a Cachement Area Management
(CAM) demonstration project aimed at controlling growing
CHAMPUS costs. Five separate (single service) military sites
were selected to participate in the 3-year CAM demonstration:
two Army, two Air Force and one Navy. Four primary objectives
of the project were to:
1. contain the rate of growth in CHAMPUS costs;
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2. improve accessibility to health care;
3. improve satisfaction with health care; and
4. maintain quality of health care. [Ref 15:p.ll]
Still other initiatives (all joint arrangements) include the
Joint Military Medical Command in San Antonio, TX (Army-Air
Force), the Delaware Valley Health Services System (DV-HSS)
(Army/Air Force/Navy) and the San Francisco Medical Command
(SFMC) (Army/Air Force/Navy). Although the DV-HSS and the
SFMC were tri-service, they were not managed/coordinated care
programs. They still have long lists of sharing and
cooperative efforts that serve as examples for others to
follow.
To 3peed the progress of the TRICARE project, the Navy
assembled a Rapid Implementation Team (RIT) in August 1991.
Members of the team had expertise in the areas of
communications, procurement, managed care and information
systems. The RIT was comprised of nine military officers;
seven Navy, one Army Reserve Medical Service Officer and one
Air Force Physician.
On October 1, 1991, The Office of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (OSD) published a memorandum titled "Strengthening the
Medical Functions of the Department of Defense." In this
memorandum, he stated that
with increasingly tight constraints on resources available
for the national defense, the Department must pursue
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aggressively actions to execute its vital missions more
effectively, including its medical mission.
Also in this memorandum he directs the implementation of
several new initiatives, one specifically being a Coordinated
Care Program (CCP). The memorandum states:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
shall implement a program to ensure coordination within
appropriate geographical areas of the provision of medical
care in DOD facilities with the provision of medical care
through the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services. The objective of the program shall be
to maximize cost-effectiveness in the delivery of high-
quality health care in the accomplishment of the
Department's medical mission.
Less than one year later, on August 14, 1992, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) published
"Policy Guidelines On The Department of Defense Coordinated
Care Program which describes the CCP as a program that
will enable the DOD and the Military Departments to better
accomplish the medical mission by improving beneficiary
access to health care services, controlling health care
costs, and ensuring quality care to all Military Health
Services System (MHSS) beneficiaries.
Less than one month later, on October 1, 1992, TRICARE-
Tidewater began operation as its three Service Centers opened
their doors for business; one in Portsmouth, one at Langley
AFB and one at Ft. Eustis.
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D. TRICARE'S MISSION
TRICARE-Tidewater is a DOD CCP whose purpose is to
optimize the utilization of the MTF's (NMC, Portsmouth;
McDonald Army Hospital, FT Eustis; 1st Medical Group, Langley
AFB) as well as a highly competitive civilian healthcare
market in the Tidewater area. Their goals are to improve
access to quality health care for all beneficiaries using the
Military Health Service System (MHSS), enhance Graduate
Medical Education and contain the increasing cost of CHAMPUS.
TRICARE's health care delivery system is based on an HMO model
where patients are channeled to an appropriate level of care
through the use of a "Gatekeeper" or primary care physician.
E. TRICARE AREA
The TRICARE cachement area is made up of a 40-mile radius
area surrounding its three major medical facilities. These
are the Naval Medical Center (NMC) in Portsmouth, 1st Medical
Group at Langley AFB, and McDonald Army Hospital at Ft.
Eustis. This equates roughly to the area from Yorktown, VA to
northern North Carolina and from the Atlantic Ocean to
Richmond, VA. The Naval Medical Center, Portsmouth, located
in Portsmouth, VA is the largest of the three facilities. It
is a 446 bed tertiary care facility that sponsors many
training, technical and graduate medical programs. The ist
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Medical Group and McDonald Army Hospital are much smaller with
70 and 57 beds respectively. Average annual outpatient visits
by facility are shown in Figure 7.
ANNUAL OUTPATIENT VISITS BY FACILITY
Service/Facility Annual Outpatient Visits*
NAVY: NMC, PORTSMOUTH 1,253,000
ARMY: McDONALD 260,000
AIR FORCE: 1st MED GROUP 340,000
FIGURE 7
*Annual figures are for FY-91
(TRICARE-Tidewater brief)
By virtue of the relative size of NMC, Portsmouth, the
Navy has been designated "lead agent" for the project. In
addition to these large medical facilities, several smaller
clinics are part of the service area. These include Army
clinics at Ft. Lee, Ft. Story, Ft. Monroe and Ft. Eustis; and
Navy clinics at NAS Oceana, Dam Neck, NAB Little Creek,
Northwest Security Group, Yorktown Naval Weapons Station, and
Norfolk's Naval Base, Naval Shipyard and Naval Air Station.
The Tidewater area was chosen as the first CCP site for many
reasons. These include the large local beneficiary
population, the in-house capacity of existing MTF's and
clinics and the abundance of local civilian providers.
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Tidewater has one of the largest populations of militar"
health care (including CHAMPUS) beneficiaries in the entire
Department of Defense. The local population is made up of
approximately 381,000 beneficiaries (active duty and
dependent). They are broken up by service as shown in
Figure 8.
BREAKDOWN OF BENEFICIARIES BY SERVICE
AIR FORCE ARMY MARINES NAVY TOTAL
45,662 46,993 10,354 278,072 381,081
FIGURE 8
Of these 381,061 beneficiaries, approximately 125,000 (33%)
are active duty, 151,000 (40%) are active duty dependents and
the remaining (27%) are retirees, their dependents and
survivors. All are eligible for direct care (active duty have
first priority, dependents second and retirees and their
dependents/survivors third). Approximately 238,000 are
eligible for CHAMPUS (active duty personnel and retirees over
age 65 are not eligible).
The second reason the Tidewater area was chosen as the
first CCP site is its ratio of population size to treatment
facility capacity (comparison of supply and demand). Active
duty military personnel are entitled, by law, to free medical
care. It is also the policy of the medical department to
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provide all other eligible beneficiaries with free in-house
care but only when space is available. Unfortunately, the
demand for care in the area far exceeds the capacity of the
local military treatment facilities. A study (simulation) was
done to estimate the maximum capacity of the MTF's, shipboard
medical facilities and clinics in the Tidewater area
(shipboard facilities can only treat shipboard personnel). In
order to see the magnitude of the shortfall, the beneficiary
population is divided into two basic categories, active and
non-active duty (see Figure 9).
BREAKDOWN OF BENEFICIARIES BY TYPE OF DUTY
ACTIVE DUTY NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES
AFLOAT 61,000
ASHORE 64,000
NON ACTIVE DUTY 256,000
TOTAL 381,000
FIGURE 9
The total estimated capacity of treatment facilities was also
broken down into the three basic categories based on the type
of facility.
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These are shipboard facilities, MTF's and clinics (see Figure
10).
In other words, the existing network of military
medical facilities can care for a maximum population of
193,000 individuals.







The local beneficiary population is 381,000; 125,000 of which
are active duty and have first priority for treatment. This
leaves 256,000 dependent and retiree beneficiaries (381,000
total-125,000 active duty) to compete for the remaining
treatment capacity of 68,000 available appointments (193,000-
125,000). This shortfall in capacity decreases the morale of
the beneficiaries in the area because they are now spending
hours on the phone trying to get an appointment.
Additionally, it has increased the number of non-active duty
beneficiaries that are forced to use CHAMPUS. Since CHAMPUS
funds pay most of the cost of treatment from civilian
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providers, as availability of direct care decreases, CHAMPUS
costs increase. Since one of the goals of CCP is to contain
costs and improve access to the direct care system, the
Tidewater area is an excellent candidate for this program.
Still another reason the Tidewater area was chosen is its
abundance of civilian health care providers. Within the 40-
mile radius service area are nineteen general acute care
hospitals, two children's hospitals, six psychiatric
facilities and one orthopedic hospital. There is also an
adequate supply of physicians representing all specialties.
The hospitals in the Tidewater area range from 50-100 bed
community hospitals to 500+ bed tertiary referral centers.
The combined service offerings of these hospitals include all
primary, secondary and tertiary services including trauma,
open heart surgery, advanced cancer care, neonatal intensive
care, burn care and transplant services. Pract~cing within
the Tidewater service area are over 2,300 non-tederal
physicians representing all specialty areas. They are
predominantly solo practitioners with a small portion
representing small, single-specialty groups. Four locally
operated HMO's also exist within the Tidewater service area.
Associated with these HMO's are over 3,300 physicians and 53
hospitals. Some, but not all of the associated physicians and
medical facilities are located within the Tidewater service
area.
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The average local civilian hospital occupancy rates range
from approximately 60% - 75%. Although percentages vary from
hocpital to hospital, most facilities within the service area
could absorb additional inpatient capacity. These moderate
occupancy rates coupled with the large supply of providers
resulted in a highly competitive local health care market. As
the laws of supply and demand apply, the DoD has an advantage
in the Tidewater area. If local providers want to be a part
of the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) within the new
TRICARE organization, they must be willing to negotiate rates
which are lower than existing CHAMPUS rates. To date, most
providers have been willing to do this as long as the rates
can be tied to volume guarantees. This arrangement not only
guarantees a regular supply of customers for the civilian
physician, it provides the government with a significant
savings over existing CHAMPUS fees.
F. TRICARE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
TRICARE's oversight responsibilities belong to the Navy as
lead agent and more specifically to the Commander in Chief,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT). The TRICARE Commanders'
Board is responsible to CINCLANFLT for planning, implementing,
managing, and evaluating the CCP in the Tidewater area. The
board is chaired by the Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital,
Portsmouth; and consists of the Commanding Officer, McDonald
Army Community Hospital, Fort Eustis; and the Commander, ist
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Medical Group, Langley Air Force Base. The TRICARE Project
Office is responsible to the Commanders' Board for the daily
operations of the TRICARE project.
The TRICARE Pro-ect Office is managed by an 0-6 military
officer who serves as Director and is charged with the daily
functions and operations of the TRICARE project. The TRICARE
Project Office has four major departments. The Resources
Department coordinates the financial management, management
information, and contract and agreement management systems.
The Clinical Services Review Department establishes,
maintains, supports, and oversees an effective Quality
Improvement Program. The Plans and Operations Department; and
the Marketing and Public Relations Department.
G. TRICARE OPERATIONAL PLAN
TRICARE's operational concept is based on improving access
to care by coordinating all of the medical resources of the
MTF and civilian providers. It is also based on controlling
health care costs by providing beneficiaries lower cost
alternatives to finance their medical expenses. Active duty
personnel assigned to units in the Tidewater area will
continue to receive their medical care from the MHSS.
However, Non-active duty beneficiaries in the Tidewater area
have three managed care options available to them in addition
to the direct care system. The three managed care options
are; TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Extra, and basic CHAMPUS.
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TRICARE Prime and TRICARE Extra offer beneficiaries a
smaller cost share percentage than CHAMPUS (i.e., dependents
of active duty service members pay 15 percent of the
negotiated rate as opposed to .IHfMPUS's 20 percent). TRiCARE
Prime provides the same benef'ts available under CHAMPUS with
additional benefit enhancemerts. These enhancements include
periodic examinations and preventive care procedures that are
not covered under CAAMPUS. Beneficiaries wishing to use
TRICARE Prime are enrolled into the program and required to
pay an annual enrollment fee instead of paying the normal
CHAMPUS deductible. Enrollees are given the choice of an
individual provider, a group practice, a clinic, or a
treatment site participating in the PPO as their primary care
manager who will act as a "gatekeeper" for specialty
referrals.
TRICARE Extra covers the same medical services as CHAIPUS.
In addition, beneficiaries choosing this option receive
discounts for office visits and hospital inpatient care by
using the PPO. Providers belonging to the PPO network offer
predetermined rates lower than the CHAMPUS allowable rates.
Th-s plan gives the beneficiaries more freedom when choosing
a provider as well as the financial plan because they do not
have to enroll. Patients may choose to receive their care
through TRICAPE Extra, standard CHAMPUS, or the direct care
system on a case-by-case basis.
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If beneficiaries choose to use one of the TRICARE
packages, they will be treated by a qualified health care
provider that belongs to the Preferred Provider Network in the
Tidewater area. The Preferred Provider Network as well as all
the MTF's and clinics are integrated through the TRICARE
Service Centers.
The Service Center functions as the hub of the managed
care program in the Tidewater area. There is one service
center located at or near each of the three MTF's. With a
single phone call to one of these Service Centers,
beneficiaries can schedule medical appointments in the MTF's,
clinics, or at a civilian health care provider who belongs to
the PPO network. Also, beneficiaries can receive information
on medical benefits and assistance with medical claims and
forms processing. The Service Centers can be the most
critical component of the TRICARE program. Beneficiaries will
judge the TRICARE system on whether the Service Centers are





TRICARE is a change initiative in the way patients access
health care in the Tidewater area. In the past, access to
care had been a problem in the community. As mentioned in
Chapter III, demand in this area exceeded capacity by 188,000
beneficiaries. There were 256,000 beneficiaries competing for
68,000 available appointments within the Military Health
Services System (MHSS) which caused to frustration when
attempting to secure an appointment. One administrator
describes what a patient went through to make an appointment:
[A patient would] call on Monday, first of all, you can't
get through, and when you do get through, they tell you to
call back next month. If you call back next month, and
the line is busy, by the time you get through, they say,
"Well, it's too late. Call back." Things like that just
drove people crazy.
TRICARE's change effort concentrated all of the
administrative booking systems into one centralized location
to provide quick, dependable entry into the Tidewater health
care delivery system with one phone call. This same
administrator asserts that now:
[A patient] calls up, he wants to be seen for a bad
stomachache, his job is stressing him out. He calls up,
he'll call our service center now for an appointment and
he'll say, "I live right next to Boone Clinic, can you see
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me?" and they say, "I don't have anything at Boone Clinic
right now, but we do have something in Sewell's Point, we
have something at Oceana, or we don't have that, we have
something at Fort Eustis." [or] "We have three doctors
that are located in your ZIP code that accept CHAMPUS,
would you like to speak with one of them?" And he says,
"Yeah, I would."
With the consolidated booking system, patients can now make
appointments within the MHSS with one phone call. If an
appointment is not available within the MHSS, this system can
locate a civilian doctor that will see military beneficiaries.
This new system gives TRICARE the visibility to see where all
the appointments are located within the area.
Beneficiaries and providers in the Tidewater area
associate TRICARE, along with its success or failure, with the
centralized booking system of the TRICARE Service Center.
When a nurse was asked what TRICARE meant to her, she
responded by saying:
.when we refer to Tricare here, we're referring to the
office in Portsmouth, the health care finders that help
the dependents and retirees schedule appointments or
direct them into clinics where they need to be seen.
That's basically, I know there's a lot more involved to
Tricare, that's basically the Tricare that we work with...
Many beneficiaries and providers don't realize that TRICARE is
attempting to not only provide quick, dependable access to
care, but it is also attempting to contain the rising costs of
care by offering the new programs mentioned in Chapter III.
After interviewing many people at the clinics and at the
service center and analyzing the data, some communication and
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coordination problems among the patients, the service center,
and the providers emerged. In this chapter, we will analyze
this central function of accessing TRICARE through the service
center.
B. COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION
Health care organizations are extremely complicated in
terms of coordination and communication. In health ca-e
organizations, the actual work of caring for patients is
highly decentralized. Each provider treats his or her own
patient away from everyone's scrutiny. One doctor maintains
that:
Doctors are pretty much special kind of people. We're
sort of independent, most of us are intelligent, probably
higher than average IQ. . .We tend to be self reliant and
independent thinkers. We question pretty much everything
and tend not to deal very well with authority and confront
authority.
Coordination and communication among these health care
professionals are controlled through the standardization of
skills, knowledge and indoctrination that is learned through
formal education and further polished through repetitive
practice in the field. Because doctors are independent
thinkers and self reliant, they make most of their decisions
based on what they've learned and practiced. The same doctor
says that they tend to:
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. . . make a lot of decisions based on bias rather than
scientific [knowledge]; by habit and bias. . . .When I
talk about bias I mean what my colleagues do, in the
cafeteria over coffee, what I talk to my consultants
about. Habit is just the way you've always done it.
Medical decision making happens most by habit and least of
all by science.
Therefore, the way to communicate with a doctor is not by
using authority but by exercising peer pressure and using
scientific data. For instance:
. . .the way to change a physician's behavior is to show
him data, facts. Just present the data, as long as it's
verifiable, if I'm here and someone else is here (doing
better than me - statistically), I'm going to go to you
and say, ". . . can we talk about how you do this, or why
you do this." The first thing is peer pressure and
showing them the data and information and let them make
the decision. That works much better than ordering
doctors who are real independent and not real responsive
to authority and by the way who. . .are you Mr.
administrator to tell me how to practice medicine. Or
even if you're the chief of staff, you only practice
medicine a percentage of the time. The rest of the time
you're playing golf and meeting with the board of
directors.
These providers do, however, share administrative and
support resources that are common to the organization. These
services include such things as finance and accounting,
registrar and records, and appointment booking. Unlike the
providers, these services operate under the traditional,
vertical organizational structure in which decisions are
centralized at the top of the hierarchy. This creates an
organization in which two parallel structures exist: one
decentralized for the health care professionals and the other
centralized for the support staff. These parallel structures
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generate friction in communicating and coordinating among the
various levels of a health care organization. Therefore,
horizontal communication and coordination becomes critical to
the success of this type of organization.
In the health care industry, it is not enough to have
formal coordination methods in place for the administrative
and supporting services and informal coordination methods for
the professionals that provide the care. These two segments
must be linked in order to have an effective and efficient
organization. Procedures for communicating and coordinating
across these different groups must be established.
TRICARE took the administrative responsibility of booking
patients for appointments and consolidated it into one unit,
the TRICARE Service Center. However, medical staffs at the
clinics now feel frustrated by their inability to influence
decisions related to the booking system. Failure to
coordinate among the service center and the providers can
result in delays in accessing the system and duplication of
efforts. If there is not adequate coordination between the
health care finder and the provider, patients may be directed
to an inappropriate provider. If there is not adequate
coordination, the providers may be reluctant to release their
appointments. TRICARE must create mechanisms to link these
two differently structured groups.
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C. TRICARE SERVICE CENTER
The TRICARE Service Center established on October 1, 1992,
is the nucleus of the managed care program in the Tidewater
area. It controls the information flow from the patient to
the provider. Nearly 400,000 beneficiaries access care
through this consolidated booking system. It is a "one stop"
information shopping center for all medical care in the area.
Before opening day, getting appointments for care at any
medical treatment facility was very difficult. Appointment
booking at the clinics was decentralized. Every clinic in the
area made their own appointments. If a patient needed an
appointment, he or she would have to shop around. Patients
would have to call every clinic in the area to find an
available appointment. Many patients never got through to the
clinics to even ask for an appointment. For example, one
beneficiary described his frustration with the system:
[I] would try to make an appointment for my children,
specifically my daughter for an eye appointment. I got on
the phone and--I never got through. I tried to make an
appointment at NavCare and I never got through to them
either--I just gave up.
Additionally, when appointments were not available within the
military system, patients were on their own to get care from
a CHAMPUS civilian care provider. This meant more shopping;
more valuable time on the phone. For most beneficiaries,
calling around or visiting various clinics in search of a good
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doctor at a reasonable price was frustrating and extremely
time consuming.
The idea to consolidate the appointment booking system
originated from the Rapid Implementation Team that was
assembled in August 1991 to accelerate TRICARE's progress.
They determined that a centralized booking system would
increase accessibility of care in the community. A contract
was awarded to Blue Cross-Blue Shield, and in less than one
year the TRICARE Service Center commenced operations on 1
October 1992.
With the inauguration of the TRICARE Service Center,
accessibility of care in the Tidewater area increased. The
service center began its operations receiving roughly 1,000
phone calls per day. Currently, the service center receives
approximately 3,500 phone calls a day, totaling about 40,000
calls a month; and, the number of appointments scheduled is
increasing rapidly. The TRICARE Service Center has increased
accessibility by streamlining communication and networks from
the patient to the medical care providers throughout the
Tidewater area.
The TRICARE Service Center is functionally organized to
assist military families with most of their health care needs.
A simple phone call allows the patient to ask general CHAMPUS
and TRICARE questions; check benefit coverage; utilize the
Health Care Finder functions and schedule appointments.
Sixty-six employees are organized into three divisions of
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labor with a director supervising the entire operation and
mediating with the TRICARE Project Office, Managed Care
Office, and CHAMPUS. The three divisions are:
1. Health Care Finders. Currently, there are 52 Health
Care Finders. Their primary responsibility is to respond to
all questions from the beneficiaries regarding medical
treatment facilities and network care in the Tidewater area.
These Health Care Finders will also make appointments for
authorized beneficiaries seeking treatment with the Medical
Treatment Facilities or the network.
2. Health Benefit Advisors: Currently there are nine
Health Benefit Advisors that work in the TRICARE Service
Center. They serve as a single point of contact for all
Health Service System Beneficiaries regarding health benefits
programs available to active duty, retired members, and their
dependents. They provide information and assistance
concerning in-patient and out-patient medical care at military
and civilian treatment facilities. They also assist
beneficiaries in processing medical claims and provide expert
advice concerning eligibility requirements.
3. Provider Specialists: Currently there are five
Provider Specialists working at the TRICARE Service Center.
Their primary responsibility is to respond to the needs of
over 1,000 network civilian providers within the Tidewater
community. They organize educational workshops and seminars
and verify credentials for all the civilian providers in the
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network. They also recruit providers f or the network when
necessary. They are the liaison between TRICARE and the
civilian providers.
All these functions are supported by a sophisticated
telephone system and an automated Digital Computer System.
The telephone system is an automatic call distribution system
that receives incoming calls and distributes the call to the
next available Health Care Finder. The system allows managers
to:
"* Monitor telephone conversations to ensure quality of
information.
"* Track peak periods of incoming calls for staffing
purposes.
The telephone system is also designed for conference calling
between the Health Care Finders, beneficiaries, clinics and
Network Providers.
The TRICARE Service Center is also on-line with a Digital
Computer system, and all the service center employees have
access to the Composite Health Care System (CHCS) Patient
Appointment Scheduling software application. This computer
system has a central data base which is used by all
facilities. It provides both the clinic and the service
center the ability to share scheduling capability and
resources. Each Health Care Finder has a terminal at his or
her desk for booking appointments at all the clinics that
provide them with either full or co-booking authority. Health
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Care Finders can register beneficiaries into the CHCS system
and verify or update demographic information with each call.
All staff personnel also have a current publication of the
Directory of Military Clinical Services which assists them
with booking and referral criteria. This publication is a
desk reference guide for the care finders. It provides them
the specifics for booking appointments at all the clinics.
This information is compiled from all the clinics throughout
the Tidewater area and is updated regularly. This publication
does not include information concerning civilian providers
participating in the PPO network. It includes only military
treatment facilities.
The primary mission of the TRICARE Service Center is to
assist the beneficiary in obtaining health care as quickly as
possible within the direct care system. If this is not
acceptable, than the beneficiary has the option to obtain care
through the civilian Preferred Provider Network. The TRICARE
Service Center has approximately 80 percent (52 of the 66
employees) of the labor force assigned as Health Care Finders.
D. TRICARE: WHAT'S WORKING AND WHAT'S NOT
We conducted interviews with members of all organizational
levels in the medical profession from management to health
care providers in the Tidewater community. From these
interviews we were able to determine which aspects of TRICARE
were working and which were not.
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1. What's Working
TRICARE is effectively reducing the administrative
workload at the clinics. The clinicians at the clinic can
spend more time taking care of the patient's needs and less
time on the telephone booking appointments. During an
interview with the Admiral, he stated that...
The TRICARE Service Center has taken a tremendous amount
of workload off the clinics in the fact that they don't
have to answer the phone all day every day. More and more
clinics have turned over almost all of their appointments
to the TRICARE Service Center. This is a direct result
people have seen that its (TRICARE) is working.
All the nurses that were interviewed agreed with the Admiral's
statement. The nurses claim that consolidating the booking
system has allowed them to better utilize their staff.
Medical staff that were being used to make appointments before
can now be used to provide medical services for the patient.
Their administrative workload was reduced by removing the
responsibility of booking appointments.
The TRICARE Service Center management and staff believe
that TRICARE is increasing the accessibility of care for all
of the beneficiaries in the Tidewater community. This is
substantiated by one beneficiary who stated how great the
service center is:
I called into the TRICARE Service Center and within five
minutes T had an appointment at the hospital and the
paperwork was all done for me. This is great! What a
system.
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The clinical staff at the clinics believe that the
implementation of TRICARE, has significantly improved the
clinic's utilization rate. The CHCS on-line computer system
shared between the TRICARE Service Center and the clinics has
been very effective in streamlining the appointment system and
reducing the overload at the walk in clinics. As one nurse at
an acute care clinic (MACD) clinic stated...
We have seen just in instituting TRICARE a vast
improvement in the utilization of this department.
Anybody who could not get an appointment anyplace else
would come here because we were one of two places in the
entire area that did not require an appointment. It was
us and the hospital ER.
With TRICARE, we don't have this hallway full of people
sitting for five hours waiting to be seen.
Prior to TRICARE the MACD averaged 90-100 patients in 16 hours
with only eight beds. Currently, with the implementation of
TRICARE the number of patients serviced at the MACD has
decreased to an average of 60-70 in the same time span. This
decrease has allowed the MACD clinic to utilize their
resources more effectively. As one nurse at the MACD
states...
This is not an ER. So we would fre ntly end up bagging
people and get them all gathered u, nd send them out.
It's made a big difference to us because we've been able
to get to those who could be seen elsewhere.
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2. What's Not Working
As with any new organizational change, TRICARE has had
its share of growing pains. Admiral McDaniel, believes that
the hardest lesson learned from the introduction of TRICARE is
the importance of effectively communicating to everyone what
TRICARE is all about. The r-rketing program aimed at
educating everyone must be rudimentary in design. Admiral
McDaniel's advice to anyone starting a program like TRICARE
is...
you have got to get elemental. You have got to get so
elemental you think you're insulting the intelligence of
everybody out there. . .Absolutely the number one lesson
learned out of this as far as I'm concerned is the
incredible difficulty of communicating effectively.
At the TRICARE Service Center, the Health Care Finders who
were interviewed find the beneficiaries confused about the
concept of the TRICARE Service Center. The beneficiaries
think that by increasing the access of care you have aiso
increased the access to free care. As one Fealth Care Finder
puts it...
The beneficiaries I talk to thought that TRICARE was still
affiliated with the service, and still free care--
regardless of where they went.
Again, we see that it is imperative to educate the
beneficiaries on what the program can offer and what to expect
when you call the TRICARE Service Center. The TRICARE Service
Center is providing a passageway for increased communication
and networking among the staffs of the local military
hospitals and clinics.
The providers at the specialty clinics are struggling with
the TRICARE Service Center booking appointments for them. The
hospital's central appointments department booked appointments
for the specialty clinics prior to the introduction of
TRICARE. Appointment clerks at the hospital had many years of
experience booking consult appointments with the specialty
clinics such as the Ear, Nose and Throat Clinic. Routinely,
the TRICARE Health Care Finder gets a certain number of slots
available for booking appointments at the specialty clinic.
Unfortunately, there are more patients with consults then
there are slots available. So the problem comes down to
learning the system (corporate knowledge) and developing a
good feedback loop between the clinic and the TRICARE Service
Center.
As we review the points made from all organizational
levels of the military medical community of Tidewater, one
general theme that's not working with TRICARE is the flow of
information. The flow of information between the patient, the
care finder, and the provider needs to be improved.
This chapter will address the information flow process of
providing access to the health care system and, through a
variance analysis, identify the key variances. When these
variances are controlled, the information flow will improve
and ultimately improve the system as a whole. The TRICARE
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Service Center is the hub of the information flow. Therefore,
the analysis is concentrated on this operation. Finally, in
Chapter V, we will draw conclusions and provide
recommendations to control the flow of information and process
it more effectively at the TRICARE Service Center and the
clinics.
E. VARIANCE ANALYSIS
"Effective organizations are those which produce excellent
results by any measure of costs, quality, or efficiency
while simultaneously enhancing the energy and commitment
of organizational members to the success of the
enterprise." [Ref 16:p. 1]
Our objective is to analyze the TRICARE Service Center
concept and operations and identify more effective ways of
processing information from the patient through the service
center to the provider. As the TRICARE project faces
increasing pressures from other competitive health delivery
systems, escalating pressures from government regulations and
their own internal problems, our objective is not to suggest
that the Service Center needs improvement, but more
importantly what can the TRICARE Service Center do to improve
the overall delivery of health care. The usefulness of this
analysis will not be limited to the Tidewater TRICARE project,
but to any community that is aggressively pursuing a better
way to deliver health care to its beneficiaries.
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The sociotechnical systems approach to organizational
design will be the underlying framework for our analysis. The
sociotechnical systems theory implies that every organization
is made up of people (the social system) using tools,
techniques and knowledge (the technical system) to produce a
service valued by its customers. [Ref 16:pp. 55-56] The
TRICARE Service Center is a new organization placed in the
constraint of the military culture, powerful leadership, and
bureaucracy. It is a mixture of labor relying on a
sophisticated technical system to acquire inputs, and it must
transform these inputs into outputs and provide services to
beneficiaries. Health care delivery is an industry with a
significantly complex mixture of technical and social
components, one particularly suited for sociotechnical system
analysis. [Ref 17:p. 315]
The degree of impact that technical arrangements have on
the TRICARE Service Center's organizational performance is
significant. The TRICARE Service Center's technical system is
intensive and requires interdependence among various providers
to complete the required tasks. This demands coordination of
accurate information and communications. Higher technological
complexity requires higher levels of communication [Ref 19:p.
56]. The health care finders in the service center rely on
the constraints of the computer system and telephone system to
satisfy the needs of the beneficiaries. It is for these
reasons that our analysis of the Service Center will focus on
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only the technical system design principles of the social
technical systems analysis.
The primary objective ot our tecnnical system analysis is
to discover factors which, acting singularly or in concert
with one another, detract from the effective operation of the
technical system. [Ref 16:p. 68] Once we have discovered
these factors we will then develop innovative ways to control
these variances.
Our analysis of the TRICARE Service Center's technical
systems will follow the following work flow stages:
1. Analyze the work flow and list the major steps in the
transformation process in the order in which they occur
2. Conduct interviews and determine variances that occur in
the transformation process
3. Construct a variance analysis matrix which identifies the
interrelations among the variances
4. Use the variance matrix to identify key variances
- impact on success criteria
- effect on other variances, particularly in
other operations
5. Construct a key variance control table
6. Suggest technical changes using sociotechnical system
design principles
STEP 1: WORK FLOW ANALYSIS. The work flow process is
based on the employee interviews that we conducted at the
TRICARE Service Center and the Medical Treatment Facilities in
the Tidewater community during our research visit in September
1993. We divided up the work flow into three explicit phases.
We traced a call from the patient's initial contact with the
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service center to the facility where the patient will receive
treatment.
The information work flow process consists of three phases
(See figure 11). Each phase is arranged in chronological
order. There are technological or work transitions that
define the boundaries between each of the phases. The
boundary between phase I and phase II is a technological one.




INITIAL PATIENT CONTACT PHASE
PHASE II




Phase I is the initial beneficiary contact phase. It
consists of the initial contact made by the service center's
Health Care Finder (HCF) and the beneficiary requesting
health care. Basically, the beneficiary telephones the
TRICARE Service Center requesting an appointment. The care
66
finder makes initial contact with the beneficiary and
obtains background data, for example: "what type of care are
you requesting?" The beneficiary may also call in to the
service center and ask questions pertaining to the Medical
Treatment Facilities and Network care in the Tidewater area.
These calls do not require booking appointments.
Phase II is where the patient's request for care is
processed. This phase consists of booking the appointment
for the patient. This phase begins with the care finder
accessing the CHCS computer to begin to book an appointment
for the beneficiary at a Medical Treatment Facility. It
includes the Health Care Finder's process for finding
availability of an appointment which will satisfy the
beneficiary's needs. The Health Care Finder may offer other
options of health care to the beneficiary should an
appointment not be available at the time or location
requested. These options include:
1. Offering an alternative time and or location within the
direct care system.
2. Making an offer to the beneficiary to utilize the
network (PPO) system.
Should the beneficiary decline primary care either with the
direct care system or through the network, the patient is
considered "handled" and no working file is generated.
Should the beneficiary accept the primary care option, the
Health Care Finder books the appointment using the CHCS
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computer system. The beneficiary is given an appointment
place, date, time, and any special instructions.
Additionally, the Health Care Finder has the option to
contact the clinic and book the appointment by means of a
teleconference call if the request is complex.
Phase III is the period where the patient receives care
from the provider. This phase starts at the time when the
appointment is booked by the service center. The phase is
completed after the patient receives care from the provider
and leaves the medical facility.
STEP 2: CONDUCT INTERVIEWS AND DETERMINE VARIANCES.
After the steps in the work flow were identified, we then
conducted interviews with personnel in the work flow process
and determined the variances within the transformation
process. Variances are defined as unexpected or unwanted
deviations from standard operating conditions or
specifications. [Ref 19:pp. 73-74] Within the three major
work flow phases, we have identified 13 incongruities that
could lead to disruptions in the process of channeling the
patient through the system effectively and efficiently. We
also identified the key criteria which can be used to judge
the success of the health care system. The following are
the variances:
1. With a phone call from a prospective patient to the
TRICARE Service Center the patient has taken the first step
in accessing the TRICARE health care delivery system. This
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initial contact can lead to some misunderstandings. For
instance, the patients, unsure of what is wrong with them,
may not convey what they need to the care finder and obtain
the wrong appointment. One care finder claims that:
[it] happens a lot. They don't know exactly what's
wrong with them. And then you have to sit there and
keep asking and asking and pulling out.
The patients must tell the care finder what kind of
appointment they need. The patient must also give the care
finder other information that may be useful in finding an
appropriate provider. For instance, the patients must
inform the care finder if it is a trauma that occurred
within the previous 24 hours. They must inform the care
finder if they're pregnant. They must inform the care
finder if they are having menstrual irregularities. They
must inform the care finder if they are having problems
breathing. These are some examples of information that the
patient can give the care finder to make it easier to find
the appropriate provider.
For instance, a woman may call up and ask for an
appointment because she is feeling nauseous but does not
tell the care finder that she is pregnant. The care finder
then books her for a regular appointment with a doctor or
with a clinic that doesn't see pregnancy related problems.
The clinic or provider is then forced to either find someone
else who can treat the patienL or treat the patient
themselves. Sometimes the patient may not mention when an
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injury occurred and may be sent to a wrong location. When a
patient is injured and requests an appointment, they must
tell the care finder what part of their body is injured.
They must tell the care finders when the injury occurred and
how it occurred. This are examples of information that
would make it easier for the care finder find to find an
appropriate provider for an injured patient. One nurse
says that many patients will call up and:
. .. say I need an appointment and the health care
finder says what happened, they'll say my foot. A lot
of them just give you the part of the body. . . then I
go well what about your foot? Well, it hurts. Well,
did you injure it? Well yes, yesterday I was playing
basketball, and I twisted it.
This same nurse says that they have had a couple of patients
come in for regular appointments that were emergency
situations. They were given a regular appointment because
the parents did not convey to the care finder that their
children were having extreme difficulty breathing and were
not given an immediate appointment or told to take the
children to the emergency room. She says that:
We have had a couple of patients come in, one that we
had--was almost coded on as a matter of fact--that had
come in and parent said "My child is wheezing." So
TRICARE wrote "child is wheezing." And, you know, we'll
schedule them an appointment for later on today. I
don't know who was at fault here. Parents should know
if their child is having that much trouble breathing,
that they should be taking them to the emergency room.
But, when TRICARE says "Okay, you've got an appointment
in, you know, an hour and a half," then they wait that
hour and a half and the child almost dies.
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There are also occasions when a patient may want the
request to be misunderstood to secure an appointment they
may otherwise not obtain. Many beneficiaries learn what to
say to the care finder to ensure they receive an
appointment. They learn what the care finder is listening
for and know what to say and what not to say. A nurse says
that:
.patients call, and I've been guilty of that too; I
know what punches their buttons so I don't say a word.
And I get into the clinic without being in the criteria
they set. I have a wheezing child. I know it's not bad
so I tell them they're not wheezing. Then I go in, they
say there's wheezing, they give them medicine and they
go home. . .And that causes the big discrepancies which
it causes now.
The care finder will schedule the patient with a provider
based on the inaccurate information. The assigned provider
may be a suitable doctor. However, without accurate
information, the care finder will have a difficult time
accurately matching the patient with an appropriate
provider. The provider assigned to the patient may not have
the capabilities needed to treat the patient.
2. Another misinterpretation may occur if the health
care finder does not ask appropriate and sufficient
questions, and thus assign the patient to an incompatible
provider. Currently, the appointment making process is
patient driven. The care finder only asks basic questions
such as: "Who is this care for?"; "What type of care do you
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need?"; "Where and when would you like to schedule the
appointment?" Care finders are not permitted to ask triage
questions that could assist them in matching the patient
with the right provider. Triage questions are basic medical
questions used to ascertain the specific medical condition
of the patient. Examples of such questions are: "How high
is your child's fever?"; "How many times have you vomited in
the last few hours?"; etc.
One care finder said that she booked a:
. I booked a lady for a medical problem--[and]
because I didn't do any triage, I didn't ask her any
questions except tne basic-- [and] they don't see women
that are pregnant. Well, this lady was seven months
pregnant. But, that wasn't a question that needed to be
asked.
Another example came from a nurse who told a story about a
pregnant lady who was assigned to her clinic inappropriately
as a result of not asking triage questions and how the
situation became a crisis:
.like this is an example that happened today. A
woman called up, she said I need an OB/GYN appointment.
She said I'm vomiting. I have nausea. . .So they gave
her an appointment at our sick call. She's the one
who's now being hydrated in the emergency room because
when we got her. We said we don't see pregnant ladies
with any kind of pregnancy related problem. She should
not have been booked in. [Now] The OB doc sees her and
decides whoa you know she's sick she needs to be in the
urgent care with, getting IV hydration. That's somebody
that should not even have been in this clinic. .She
needed to go through Portsmouth.
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If the care finder had asked some triage questions the woman
may have been assigrad with an appropriate provider.
3. Many patients may not be enrolled in the program for
various reasons. Therefore, during the initial patient
contact, the health care finder may not have access to the
patients' history. If the history is not present in the
computer system, the care finder may not know if the patient
is eligible for care. This may make it difficult to
provide quick service to the patient or it may cause the
care finder to turn down an eligible patient from receiving
care.
4. As part of their quality control, health care
finders are allotted ten minutes per phone call. Most care
finders average five ninutes per call. One way the TRICARE
Service Center measures their effectiveness is by using time
per phone call. Their goal is to process as many claims and
requests for appointments as possible. However, at times
the complexity of a patient's call may require more time to
provide better service to the patient. Some calls will
become lengthy "going-nowhere" calls. These calls must be
controlled and terminated. But other calls will require
legitimate, intensive research. For instance, one care
finder told about a call she received:
.the other day, I had a patient she called me, she
was active duty and got out of military and went into
the reserves and had a baby a month ago. She was
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calling to get care for her baby. The baby and the
mother were showing up on our network as ineligible.
This forced the care finder to devote extra time to call a
couple of places for information. She called the Personnel
Support Detachment and the woman's previous command to find
out whether she was eligible to receive care or not. The
care finder found out that:
Someone had misinformed [the patient] that once she was
released from the military and 1 month after she had the
baby that both of them would still be eligible for care.
But this did not necessarily mean 7 months down the
road. So she got out of the military when she got
pregnant. So she was informed by her command that she
would receive care, when in fact her time had run out.
This caused the care finder to research the case to
determine that the patient was not eligible for care. The
care finder exceeded the allotted ten minutes, but she
provided quality assistance to the patient.
5. After obtaining information such as who the
appointment is for, why the patient needs to be seen, and
where and when the patient would like the appointment, the
care finder attempts to process the patient's request.
However, sometimes the health care finder may be unsure as
to which provider the patient needs to see. For instance,
a mother calls for an appointment for her 15 year old
daughter in pediatrics. The care finder than looks at the
Directory of Military Clinical Services to determine what
pediatric clinic will take her. Some pediatric clinics will
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treat children up to the age of 12 or 13. Other clinics
uill take them up to the age of 18. However, most pediatric
clinics will not take a female patient for "female
problems." So these patients must be referred to the OB/GYN
clinics. Since the care finders' job is patient-driven and
can't ask simple triage questions, the care finder may be
unsure it she can make an appointment for the patient at the
pediatric clinic that will see children up to the age of 16
or not. What if the patient wants to be seen for "female
problems," and the care finder cannot ask the appropriate
question to assist in matching the patient with the
appropriate provider? She may assign the patient to the
pediatric clinic as the mother requested, but in fact, the
patient needed to be seen at an OB/GYN clinic.
Another example is when a patient calls and says "I have
a cut in my arm. I need an appointment to see a doctor."
Does the care finder direct the patient to the emergency
room or can the care finder steer the patient to an acute
care clinic that takes care of minor lacerations? The care
finder may be unsure where to direct the patient because she
is not allowed to ask simple triage questions such as "Is
this a small cut or are you bleeding profusely?" If it's a
small cut the care finder may refer the patient to the
nearest acute care clinic. However, if the cut is large and
the patient is bleeding profusely the care finder may refer
the patient to the nearest emergency room. These are
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examples of situations that can cause the care finder to be
confused about where uo send the patient and can lead to
inappropriately matching the patient with the wrong
provider.
6. As with any new program, beneficiaries may be
unclear about the newly established procedures. In
Tidewater, patients may be unclear about how the new TRICARE
managed care program works. Unfamiliarity alone does not
detract from a patient effectively accessing the health care
system. Incongruities occur when, through ignorance,
patients refuse to acquiesce to the new system and cause
disruptions by fighting the system.
a. For example, unfamiliarity with the appointment
booking system in the Tidewater area may lead to some
confusion. One care finder says that:
A lot of people still don't understand the concept of
booking the appointments and scheduling appointments
with the clinics. . .I had a young lady call about an
hour ago. She called to make an appointment for her
child, and the clinic she wanted to go to, there wasn't
an appointment available, and I offered her another
clinic.
The care finder went on to explain that the patient didn't
believe her, so she called the clinic herself. The clinic
didn't have an ap intment available; however, the clinic
treated her anyway. By squeezing the patient into the full
day's schedule, other patients were forced to wait for their
scheduled appointment. This is where the deviation occurs.
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There is no deviation from assigning the patient to an
appropriate provider because the patient does not understand
the system. The deviation occurs when the clinic does not
refer the patient to the Service Center and treats the
patient.
Many beneficiaries ignore the new appointment booking
procedures altogether and call the clinics directly. Many
clinics are not equipped to handle incoming calls for
appointments, however. As a result, these calls will
disrupt the clinics' main mission, to provide quality care
to the patients. Many times what results is an unsatisfied
customer who blames their inability to secure an appointment
on the service center. One care finder says that these
unsatisfied patients can become "very upset, sometimes
outrageously rude and start yelling at you."
b. Another example is when beneficiaries insist on
receiving care within the MHSS. They insist on receiving
care through the military because they believe that they
rate free health care and don't understand the military
health care system in the Tidewater area. However, military
health care is only guaranteed to active duty personnel.
Dependents and retirees are not guaranteed access to free
care. The military will attempt to provide free care when
ever possible. But, if care is not available through the
MHSS, dependents and retirees are encouraged to seek care
with providers who accept CHAMPUS or belong to PPO network.
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Also people may insist on receiving care through the
MHSS because they like the quality of care the military
offers. Or, some retirees insist on receiving care through
the MHSS because that is the only thing they know; they are
unwilling to change.
These people make it difficult for the care finder to
provide quick, dependable access to health care. If people
insist on seeing only military providers, the system breaks
down when they are forced to wait until an appointment is
available. However, if they were willing to utilize the PPO
network, they could be guaranteed an appointment almost
immediately. These people cause an unnecessary disruption
in channeling the patient to an appropriate provider.
c. Still another example is when patients are
confused about the TRICARE health care options and what they
offer. Many patients turn down the PPO option and insist on
receiving care through the MHSS because they are unsure of
what they're getting into. They don't know what options
they are eligible for (i.e., TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Extra,
or standard CHAMPUS as mentioned in Chapter III). They
don't know how much each option will cost them. For
instance, they may not know that TRICARE Prime will require
an annual enrollment fee instead of paying the normal
CHAMPUS deductible. One care finder mentioned that she had
a beneficiary walk in one day that refused to use the
provider network. He "would much rather prefer to go to the
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naval hospital," than receive care from a non-military
provider. The care finder went on to say that this
beneficiary had been using the MHSS for over 20 years, and
he just did not understand the new options and refused to
try them. Again, these beneficiaries detract from the
effective operation of the TRICARE managed care program by
placing a burden on the booking system and the military
providers. As mentioned before, the MHSS does not have the
capacity to provide health care to the beneficiaries in the
area. If patients insist on being treated by military
providers instead of civilian providers participating in the
PPO network, they will make it extremely difficult for
system to provide quick, dependable access to health care.
It is extremely difficult to provide beneficiaries access to
care when they refuse to utilize the PPO network.
7. As the care finders attempt to process the patients'
request, they may be unfamiliar with the clinics' services
and booking criteria. A clinic's booking criteria are
conditions that patients must meet to receive an appointment
in that particular clinic. These booking criteria are
generated at the clinics and made available to the Service
Center for the care finders to use when scheduling
appointments. All the clinics' booking criteria are held in
a document called Directory of Military Clinical Services.
Each care finder has a copy of this document by his or her
terminal.
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For instance, Boone Clinic's pediatric department has 8
pages of booking criteria. It does not treat patients with
serious illnesses and injuries requiring emergency
evaluation. These patients should be directed to the
nearest emergency room. The booking criteria goes on to
list 12 examples of emergencies that are not treated there.
The booking criteria lists five pediatric doctors and two
pediatric nurse practitioners available to treat patients.
The booking criteria also lists 12 symptoms or complaints
that are not to be assigned to a nurse practitioner. The
booking criteria lists 15 special requests and instructions
for booking a "well baby" appointment at their clinic.
Finally, the booking criteria lists 16 general booking
information.
Some clinics' booking criteria are extremely complicated
and make it difficult for the care finder to understand the
clinics' rules. To circumvent this problem, one OB/GYN
clinic has establisbhd a screening appointment where all
patients requesting an OB/GYN appointment will be sent.
During this screening, the provider will determine what kind
of care the patient requires. This removes the need for the
care finder to ask triage questions or for complicated
booking criteria.
Here is an example of a patient being assigned to the
wrong appointment because of complicated booking criteria; a
woman calls for an appointment for a mammogram. This woman
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has had breast implants. A care finder sets an appointment
with a clinic for a mammogram. However, the care finder
doesn't know that the clinic will not perform mammograms on
women that have had implants. Or, the appointment is set
for 20 minutes. However, it requires the clinic one hour to
perform a mammogram on women that have had breast implants.
Another example is that the care finder does not realize
that independent duty corpsmen do not do pelvic exams and
assign a female to one. Another example is that a care
finder may assign a female for a pap exam at one of the
clinics. Whenever a pap exam is given, a female must be
present. However, the care finder may not know that the
clinic has no available females to be present during the pap
exam. This changes on a daily basis. The clinics may have
other commitments for that day ,and therefore, may not have
the available staff to conduct a pap exam. The deviation
occurs when the clinics' booking criteria are so complicated
it causes the care finder to misunderstand them and assign
patients to wrong providers.
Care finders do have the ability to talk to providers
while talking to the patient if the request is too complex.
Many times the care finder does not know whether a specific
provider can provide the services the patient is seeking.
Or the care finder is instructed to contact the clinics if
the patient presents certain ailments. The care finder can
then conference call a,.d talk to the provider as well as the
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patient. For instance, one nurse says that "if the people
present. . .problems [such] as chest pain, wheezing,
bleeding from any orifice, they should conference call with
the nurse" at the clinic. Conference calling allows the
care finder the flexibility to ensure the patient is being
directed to the appropriate provider.
However, many times this option is not used by the care
finder. One reason is that the care finder is pressured
into keeping the calls down to ten minutes. If the care
finder takes the time to conference call, the call will more
than likely take longer than ten minutes. Another reason
the care finder does not conference call is that she may not
realize it is needed. This may cause some disruptions in
matching the patient with the right provider. By not
conference calling when a care finder is unsure whether a
provider can treat the patient, the care finder is running
the risk of sending the patient to a provider who does not
treat that particular ailment.
8. Lack of knowledge of the health care system or
unfamiliarity of the area may lead the patient to
misinterpret the appointment. One nurse states that
patients have been showing up at her clinic recently that do
not have an appointment. When they check the computer, they
find that the patient has an appointment at one of the other
clinics. She says:
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They're showing up at (our clinic). We show no record
of them having an appointment and we look at TRICARE, or
in the computer CHCS and they actually have the
appointment at Navcare or another site.
This may occur because the patient may get the wrong
time and place for the appointment. Or, they may not know
what clinic they have their appointment in. For instance,
in the Tidewater area there are two NAVCARE clinics. Many
times the patient may not know that there are two clinics
and may show up at the wrong one. Many beneficiaries don't
realize how many clinics there are in the area. They don't
know the clinics' names. All they know is that there is a
clinic close to where they live or work. And when they call
for an appointment and they're told that they have an
appointment at Boone clinic, it is possible that they will
assume that they just made an appointment at the clinic
close to where they live or work such as Oceana which is 20
miles away from Boone Clinic. Again, this can impede the
channeling of .ie patient to an appropriate provider.
9. Many times, appointments require special
instructions. Some examples are:
"Do not eat anything after 10 pm the night before your
lab work-up.,"
"Please bring any medication that you are currently
taking with you to the appointment."
"Bring your medical and shot records with you to the
appointment."
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"Please ensure that you have all the forms that need to
be filled out and signed for your physical examination."
"Please bring appropriate clothing for your physical
therapy appointment, such as shorts and a T-shirt."
"Please bring in a urine specimen for your appointment."
And many times, these special instructions are
misunderstood by the patient or just not communicated well
by the care finder. The care finder may also forget to give
these special instructions to the patient. This causes some
disruptions if the patient does not follow the instructions.
It can either prolong the appointment or delay the
appointment until the instructions are carried out.
10. As the health care finder attempts to process the
patients' request, problems may arise as a result of the
patient being unaware that the illness is an emergency. For
example, one nurse stated that a young mother had called in
for an appointment for her baby because the baby wasn't
taking the bottle. Well, as it turned out, the baby was
dehydrating and needed to be taken to an emergency room.
Another patient called in to see a doctor. He had been in
an automobile accident the day before and had hurt his head.
He was now feeling dizzy and wanted to see a doctor. This
man didn't need an appointment; he needed to go to the
emergency room. One mother called for an appointment
because her son had a cold and was having problems
breathing. As it turned out, this boy was having extreme
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problems breathing. When he showed up for his appointment a
couple of hours later, he was immediately evacuated to the
nearest emergency room. These are examples of how not
knowing the illness is an emergency can cause the care
finder to match the patient with the wrong provider.
11. There are times when the patient, after receiving an
appointment, will have to wait for service. One
administrator mentioned that this is especially true in the
specialty clinics. For example, the ears, nose, and throat
clinic has approximately 100 appointment slots available per
month. However, in any given month, there may be as many as
200 patients being referred to this specialty clinic. The
care finders are forced to squeeze these 200 patients into
the 100 available slots. As a result, the specialty doctors
are now forced to treat 200 patients and will inevitably
fall behind schedule. This will force the patients to
arrive at an appointed time and sit at the clinic waiting
for service. This is definitely an interruption in the
process of channeling the patient through the health care
system efficiently and effectively. Also, the orthopedic
clinic treats roughly 5,500 patients per month. However,
there are about 6,300 patients needing appointments leaving
a backlog of 800 patients.
There are a couple of reasons why these two specialty
clinics are overloaded with patients. One -ason is that
these clinics have a set amount of appointments per month.
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However they are not regulated. These set amount of
appointments are not distributed to the clinics. The
clinics are not aware how mpay patients they can refer to
these specialty clinics in a given time frame. These
clinics are not restricted on the amount of patient they can
refer to the specialty clinics. The clinics acting as gate
keepers for these specialty clinics need to know how many
appointment slots are available for them to refer patients
to. In the case of the complex orthopedic clinic, patients
are referred to the clinic without specifying what kind of
orthopedic subspecialty is required (i.e., hand, back, leg,
etc.). This causes the patient to be seen more than once to
accurately treat the problem, and subsequently, causes a
backlog in the system. Most of the 5,500 patients being
seen and the 800 waiting to be seen are revisits. The
clinics referring these patients to the orthopedic clinic
need to specify what subspecialty is required to treat the
patient.
12. Once the appointment is made, sometimes care may not
be available at the facility. Perhaps after the appointment
was made, the doctor is not available. For instance, a
nurse at a clinic described how a doctor walked up to her at
1000 one day, told her that he had to run to court and that
he was going to be back after noon. When the patients
showed up there was no care available for them.
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Another nurse described an incident concerning a flight
surgeon. Not every clinic has a flight surgeon available.
Therefore, when service men and women assigned to their
clinic need to be seen by a flight surgeon, the clinic calls
the nearest place with a flight surgeon and books an
appointment. In this case, an appointment to see a flight
surgeon was made for a particular day. However, the flight
surgeon was not available on that day. The flight surgeon
had failed to inform the staff that he was not going to be
in that particular day. According to one nurse, these
situations happen almost every day. One nurse describes how
every day the available staff changes. Maybe someone had to
take emergency leave; maybe someone had to go to court; or
just maybe someone had to attend a last minute meeting.
These situations may cause the care not to be available for
the patients when they show up for their appointments.
If an appointment is made with a wrong provider, that
patient may show up for his appointment to find that there
is no care available for him. For example, one day a boy
was scheduled for an appointment with a doctor who
specializes in internal medicine. This provider, however,
does not treat children. When the mother arrived with her
son for her appointment, there was no care available for
him. The clinic had to squeeze him in with another doctor.
This of course causes other problems. The doctor who sees
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this patient will now be running behind schedule, and all
his assigned patients will not be seen on time.
The clinic must inform the Service Center when there are
changes in the ability to provide the care they advertise.
If it is a permanent chinge, the clinics must revise their
booking criteria. If it is a temporary, planned change, the
clinics must inform the Service Center with plenty of time
to respond to the change. If it is a last minute change,
the clinic must inform the Service Center immediately to
prevent any patient from being assigned a provider or care
that is not available.
13. We determined that the critical success in
channeling the patient through the health care system is
when the patient receives care. The whole reason the
clinics exist is to provide care to the beneficiaries. The
main mission of these clinics is to provide quality care to
the patient. Therefore, the actual treatment received by a
patient can be used to judge the success of channeling the
patients through the health care system.
14. After the care is given, the provider will make a
follow-up appointment for the patient if necessary. The
service center at this time makes few appointments for
follow-ups. The providers prefer to make their own follow-
up appointments to ensure continuity of care for the
patient. This system can break down when the clinic books
the patient for a follow-up appointment and fails to inform
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the TRICARE Service Center that a particular slot is no
longer available. What can happen is that the Service
Center will book a patient in a slot that was reserved by
the clinic for someone else.
Another example given by a care finder is when older
people call to set an appointment for chronic problems such
as diabetes they tend to ask for a follow-up appointment.
Every time a person calls for an appointment for a chronic
problem, he or she must be given a routine, non-follow-up
appointment. Many times, months go by before a person with
a chronic problem requests an appointment. In these cases,
the doctor needs to review with the patient what has been
the problem in the months that passed since the last
appointment. These appointments take longer than the
follow-up appointments.
Still another example are those people who call for a
follow-up appointment months after they were suppose to make
an appointment. A person will call and say "I'm suppose to
follow-up." However, it has been three months since he was
treated. In this situation, the patient needs a regular
appointment. The doctor needs to review the patient's
entire case. These cases require regular appointments not
follow-up appointments. These situations will interfere
with the process of matching the patient with the right
appointment and providing quick, dependable access to the
health care system.
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The above variances were identified through interviews
with people at the TRICARE Service Center and at the
clinics. These are the people who ensure that the patient
has access to health care in the Tidewater area.
STEP 3: CONSTRUCT A VARIANCE ANALYSIS MATRIX. In step 3
we constructed a variance analysis matrix. Again, variances
for each phase were identified through discussions and
interviews with supervisors and employees at the Service
Center and the clinics who actually perform the work. As
mentioned before, variances are defined as unev'pected or
unwanted deviations from standard operating conditions or
specifications. [Ref 16:pp. 73-74]
Exhibit 1 displays the variance analysis matrix. The
purpose of the matrix is to display all the variances that
will occur within each phase. The matrix will also assist
in identifying and controlling variances at their source.
All of the variances listed are in the order in which they
would occur.
On the left of the matrix, listed I-III, are the three
phases of the work flow process. On the right in descending
order are the 14 variances. These are the variances
identified in the interviews that are the main factors which
cause the work flow process to change. The (X)'s within the
matrix correspond to the variances that interact with other
variances. Similar to a mileage chart on a road map; each
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variance and another. The absence of an (X) in a cell
indicates that the two variances in question are unrelated.
[Ref 16:pp. 73-74]
The first step in the construction of the matrix was to
list the phases along the left side of the matrix.
Boundaries are then drawn to identify and separate the
variances. This also denotes barriers that must be overcome
to engage in interdependent problem solving in those cases
where a variance in one phase results in a variance
occurring in another.
The second step was to list from left to right all 14
variances in descending order within the work flow process.
The third step was to fill out the matrix and ascertain
whether the variance in question causes other variances to
occur. [Ref 19:p. 74] If the variance effects other
variances, then an (X) was placed in the appropriate box.
For example; under variance 1 (Request by the patient is
unclear) there are MX)'s that correspond to variance numbers
3-11, 13 and 16-18. This implies that if variance 1 occurs
than all these corresponding variances will also be
effected. The critical success is identified on the matrix
as number 13. The critical success is when the patient
receives treatment. It is identified on the matrix to show
i Lihe variance will singulary effect the critical success.
As shown in Exhibit I, all variances within ihe nfcrmation
flow effect the critical success.
92
STEP 4: IDENTIFY KEY VARIANCES. The fourth step was to
identify the key variances within the matrix. Once each
variance had been evaluated, we judged which variances are
most detrimental to accessing health care. Our judgments
were based on:
1. The impact of the variance on the success criteria;
(the success criteria is identified on the matrix as
number 13, treatment received)
2. The extent to which the variance causes other
variances to occur.
Those variances which we judged as the most significant are
categorized as a "key variance" and in exhibit 1 are denoted
with an asterisk next to the number in the matrix.
STEP 5: CONSTRUCT KEY VARIANCE CONTROL TABLE. Stage 5
was to construct a key variance control table. The
objective of this stage in the technical analysis was to
discover how key variances are currently controlled in the
system. Refer to Exhibit II for the Key Variance Control
Table. The occurrence of key variances were traced to:
1. The unit operation in which the variance occurs
(Service Center, Clinic or Network).
2. Where in the unit of operation does the variance
occur.
3. The unit operation in which the variance can be
controlled or otherwise corrected.
4. By whom in the unit operation is the variance
observed.
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6. What data, technologies, or special skills are needed
to engage in controlling the variances.
7. What changes in job design are necessary to control
the variances.
The key variance control table (Exhibit II) clearly
shows whether or not the health care finder or patient
ad.ministrator at the clinic who creates the variances in the
operation is capable of identifying and controlling the
incongruities at their source. [Ref 16 :p. 78]
The person creating the key variances has the ability to
identify them but not the authority to correct them.
Therefore, our objectives are not only to identify the key
variances but also to move the authority to the point where
the variances occur. If this is not possible, innovative
ways for other personnel to identify the variances and
control them from their position must be developed. In the
next chapter, we will discuss step six and identify the
variances which have the greatest impact on the success
criteria and make recommendations to help control or prevent
these key variances.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter IV we identified 13 variances that occurred
in the information flow between the patient and the provider
of health care. All these variances were then compared
against each other to determine how often they occur and how
significant their impact is on the critical success
(Treatment received by the patient). A careful study of the
variance analysis identified three key variances that occur
frequently throughout all phases of the operation. These
variances as shown in the variance matrix have a significant
impact on the critical success. (Refer to Exhibit I).
The three key variances were evaluated using the
Variance Analysis Control Table. This control table allowed
us to develop conclusions and make logical recommendations.
The results indicate that the following three key
variances significantly interfere with the information flow.
(1) The Patients request is unclear, (2) Unclear contact by
the Health Care Finder, (3) The Health Care Finder is
unfamiliar with the clinic's services or booking criteria.
For the overall information system to be more effective,
these variances must be controlled at the TRICARE Service
Center. Applying the Technical Systems Design Principles
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regarding the control of key variances, we conclude the
following:
1. The patients request is unclear. This variance
occurs when a patient calls the Health Care Finder (HCF) at
the TRICARE Service Center and is not sure what is medically
wrong with them. The patient cannot clearly explain what
their ailment is. It can also occur when the patient
exaggerates and in some cases does not divulge all the
information concerning their illness or injury to the Health
Care Finder. In many cases this information is crucial to
the Health Care Finder in order to book an appointment with
the right provider at the right clinic or treatment
facility. The HCF is also limited to the type and degree of
questioning that can be asked of the beneficiary. A
strictly enforced policy at the service center prohibits
triaging a patient. Due to the number of beneficiaries
calling the service center, the HCF is also limited to
spending only ten minutes with the patient on the telephone.
All these factors singularly or in concert with each other
cause this key variance to occur.
The Health Care Finder has the knowledge and the
technical references to identify the variance but cannot
control it. During our interviews with several Health Care
Finders and clinicians, a patients request that is unclear
can cause serious consequences. For example; a HCF sent a
women who was pregnant to a physician at a clinic who cannot
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see pregnant women; patients with emergency conditions
requiring urgent care were given an appointment by the
Health Care Finder and was sent to a clinic when they should
have been directed to the nearest acute care facility. This
variance can cause a breakdown in the effectiveness of the
system. Social tension builds between the clinic and the
service center. The clinical staff question the ability of
the Health Care Finders in booking appointments for the
clinic. Alternatively, the patient becomes confused as to
the effectiveness of the TRICARE Service Center. For these
reasons this key variance must be controlled so as not to
interfere with the information flow, causing breakdowns to
occur and ultimately effecting the overall critical success
of the system; which is receiving treatment.
2. Unclear contact by the Health Care Finder. This key
variance occurs because the HCF is confined to the type and
the degree of questioning that can be asked of the
beneficiary. The HCF cannot diagnose a patient's illness or
injury properly without consulting a clinician via a
teleconference call. Without the ability to field medical
questions to accurately diagnose the patients illness or
injury can result in the patient going to the wrong provider
for treatment.
The current system for booking appointments at the
TRICARE Service Center is patient driven. The Health Care
Finder is limited to the information the patient provides
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and then makes an appointment with the provider. By
contract, The Health Care Finder can only ask basic
questions such as: "what type of care do you need; where
would you like to go for your appointment." Health Care
Finders are not permitted to triage the patient on the
telephone. Telephone Triaging implies asking basic medical
questions used to ascertain the specific medical condition
of the Patient. Currently, the contract between the TRICARE
Service Center and the military Health Service System
specifically states that the Health Care Finder will not
triage or attempt tc' diagnose a patient's illness on the
telephone. These rules are strictly enforced by the
supervisors who randomly monitoring the Health Care Fin(er's
teleph2Lie calls The consequences resulting from an unc'ear
contact by the Health Care Finder can become very serious
and life threatening. For example, an incident occurred
where a pregnant women was sent to a clinic cn a routine
sick call appointment. The Heath Care Finder did not know
that she was pregnant and extremely ill. This patient
should have been sent to the urgent care facility or the
hospital emergency room. The concern is that the Health
Care Finders are not medically trained and lack the
knowledge to correctly triage a patient's illness,
especially via a telephone. Therefore, telephone triage
questions must be fielded by expert cliniciains. The Health
Care Finder must conduct a teleconference call when there is
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doubt concerning the patient's illness. Then the clinician
will decide when and if the clinic will see the patient.
This variance occurs at the TRICAPE Service Center by the
Health Care Finder and the only mechanism to control this
variance is by a teleconference call from the Health Care
Finder to the clinical staff at the treatment facility.
3. The Inird and final key variance in the `-iformation
flow process is when a Health Care Finder (HCF) is
infamiliar with the services or the booking criteria at the
clinic. This variance can occur wh i a HCF books an
appointment for a patient with a provider who is not
trained, knowledgeable or available to treat the patient.
For example, an instance occurred where a Health Care Finder
booked a 20-minute mammogram appointment at a clinic for a
women. TI~is particular clinic does not have equipment or
personnel available to conduct mammograms. Another
instance occurred when a Health Care Finder booked a female
for a pap exan at a clinic. The clinic requires a female
clinician to be present during pap exam. However, the
clinic h~a a shortage of female clinicians that day for pap
exams and the service center or the HCF were not informed of
this situation. These clinical staff changes occur on a
daily basis and can effect various types of appointments.
This variance can also ocrcur if the HCF is uncertain
about the booking criteria at the clinic. The more
.omplicateJ the booking criteria is for a given appointment,
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the more difficult it is for a Health Care Finder to
schedule an appointment at the clinic. Booking criteria
are generated at the clinic and forwarded to the service
center to assist the HCF when scheduling appointments. All
the booking criteria is then compiled regularly in a book
called the Directory of Military Clinical Services. This
book is on the desk of every Health Care Finder and assists
them in scheduling appointments for any military treatment
facility in the Tidewater area. It contains all detailed
instructions for booking appointments at each treatment
facility.
Complicated booking criteria can be very difficult to
follow and HCF's have misunderstood the booking criteria at
certain clinics. For example, pediatric appointments at
Boone Clinic contain 16 general conditions that must be
reviewed by the HCF prior to making a pediatric appointment.
Then if the pediatric appointment is a well baby
examination, there are 15 additional conditions that must be
satisfied prior to scheduling the appointment. Should the
appointment be made for a Pediatric Nurse Practitioner, then
the HCF must review an additional 12 conditions. If any
one of the conditions are met, then the HCF must go through
another clinic's pediatric booking criteria in order to
schedule the child for the appointment. Booking criteria
can also vary between each clinic. Booking criteria for
Oceans Pediatric appointments unlike Boone clinic has 14
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conditions for pediatric appointments. These variances
occur when the Health Care Finder fails to check the booking
criteria for that particular clinic. It can also occur
when the clinic does not update the service center on
changes to the Directory of Military Clinical Services
booking criteria. This variance will also occur if the
clinic should change their booking criteria and fail to
inform the service center. The HCF is unable to completely
control this variance from occurring without adequate
feedback from the clinics. The clinic are also responsible
for this variance occurring because they generate the
booking criteria. The current process in place to control
this variance at the TRICARE Service Center are accurate and
easy to read booking sheets or teleconference calls to the
clinic from the Health Care Finder.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. The following actions are recommended to control the
key variance; a patient's request is unclear.
a. A marketing program aimed at educating the
patient on answering health related questions that the
Health Care Finder must know to accurately determine the
patients necessities without triaging. As new personnel
arrive in the Tidewater area, educate them on the operation
of the TRICARE Service Center. Conduct monthly tours
through the TRICARE Service Center for all new personnel
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arriving in the Tidewater Community. Classes could be
conducted on training beneficiaries on how to self diagnose
illnesses or injuries, assist the Health Care Finder in
booking the appointment.
b. We also recommend the time constraint become
situational and not limited to a ten-minute phone
conversation between the HCF and the patient. A Health Care
Finder's measure of effectiveness should not be determined
on how quickly they can find an appointment for a
beneficiary. It should measure how effectively the Health
Care Finder can accurately booking appointments. The
critical success is based on the beneficiary receiving the
required care. Health Care Finders should have the ability
to work with a patient and identify exactly what the illness
is so that the appropriate provider can be chosen to treat
the illness.
c. By allowing the Health Care Finder the
opportunity to exhaust all resources and educate the
beneficiaries through an effective marketing program are two
avenues that will foster better communication between the
HCF and the beneficiary. This will lead to a better control
over this variance.
2. The following actions are recommended to control the
key variance; unclear contact by the Health Care Finder.
a. We recommend assigning a clinical triage team
headed by a nurse to work at the TRICARE Service Center.
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This team would be comprimised of personnel knowledgeable
and experienced with triaging patients. They would work at
the service center and assist the Health Care Finder book
appointments when triaging a patient is necessary. This
recommendation was also surfaced by some of the Health Care
Finders during our interviews at the Service Center. For
example, one Health Care Finder said during an interview...
I can't triage--I'm limited. I think the clinics wish
that we could triage. And maybe some day they will--if
they get a nurse here, I think that would be a big
improvement. When you get somebody that calls--and it's
like--gut feeling, and that's a lot of my problem--I get
these gut feelings.'This isn't the appropriate clinic for
you, but we can't triage--so, I have to either recommend
you call that clinic and talk to the nurse; or, try and
encourage you to go to maybe the Emergency Room--to where
you're going to get better treatment.'
b. A clinical triage team working with the Health Care
Finders can assist in controlling this variance and
ultimately reduce the need to conduct teleconference calls
to the clinic every time a patient must be triaged.
3. The following actions are recommended to control the
key variance; Health Care Finders are unfamiliar with the
clinic's services or booking criteria.
a. We recommend that a patient administration team
consisting of about four personnel with medical experience
in scheduling appointments. Additionally they would need to
know the clinics departmental capabilities to include
personnel staffing requirements. Their mission would be to
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work at the service center and assist the HCF's develop high
quality, easily to understand booking criteria. They would
act as a liaison between the service center and the clinics.
They could keep abreast of the changes in services,
personnel and booking criteria and feed this information to
the service center on a regular basis.
b. We also recommend that work group meetings be
held to provide continuous feedback between the clinics and
the service center.
c. We recommend standardizing the booking criteria
at certain clinics that have the same departments as in
other clinics throughout the Tidewater area. Standardizing
the booking criteria will control the variance caused by
complicated booking criteria. For example, there are at
least three clinics in the Tidewater area that have a
pediatric department. Currently, each pediatric clinic has
different set of booking criteria. We recommend having one
standardized set of booking criteria that can apply to all
the pediatric departments. The Health Care Finders could
then learn these standard conditions and know that they
apply to all other pediatric departments when scheduling
appointments for the clinics.
C. THESIS SUMMARY
Department of Defense health care costs are rising
extremely fast. Even though the military is downsizing,
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health care costs will continue to escalate as military
hospitals and treatment facilities close and the use of
civilian care increases. The managed care approach is one
way of effectively controlling costs and increasing the
quality and accessibility of care. The TRICARE
Demonstration Project in the Virginia Tidewater community is
a working example of the managed care approach to quality
cost-effective health care; using the combined resources of
the Army, Navy and Air Force. The service center is the
focal point of the operation, directing over 400,000
beneficiaries to the closest available provider in the
military direct care system. TRICARE also has a network of
Preferred Providers readily available in the civilian
community at a reduced cost to increase accessibility of
care to the community.
The Department of Defense understands that to
effectively run a leaner more efficient medical system a
strategy that promotes inter-service cooperation is
imperative. This is what three of the top military health
care leaders said in an article in the Army Times, dated 6
December, 1993...
We cannot afford to cannibalize each other and be overly
pLrochial (Army Surgeon General Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Alcide
LaNoue)
We've got to train as a team and will win as a team on
the battlefield or in the medical marketplace. (Air
Force MG (Dr.) Edgar Anderson, commander of Wilford
Hall AF Medical Center,
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You must get fear out of the system... We shouldn't be
afraid of getting smaller. Navy Surgeon General, Vice
Admiral (Dr.) Donald Hagen,
Our thesis analyzed the successful approach to the
delivery of health care by the TRICARE Project Office in the
Tidewater Community. We explained in Chapter II the history
of medicine as a backdrop to show how the practice of
medicine has changed over the years. We described in
Chapter III how the military has moved towards joint
operations and this movement is being spearheaded by
programs such as this TRICARE Project. Tidewater area was
chosen to demonstrate these managed care objectives. As
described in Chapter III, Tidewater was the most viable
choice to test a managed care approach.
Through interviews with members of all levels in the
military medical community of Tidewater, we determined which
aspects of TRICARE were working and which were not. We
examined what was not working with TRICARE and identified a
reoccurring information flow problem seen by all levels.
This led us to determine the cause and focus our efforts on
the hub of the information flow, the TRICARE Service Center.
The TRICARE Service Center is well designed and executed
with an objective to bring the patient close to the provider
of healLh care. We analyzed this process using a
Sociotechnical systems approach with emphasis on the
technical design principles. We created a variance matrix
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which assisted in determining the root causes of the
information flow problem. By using the Variance Analysis
Control Table we could identify where the variances existed
and any system in place to control them. The table also
provided a crosswalk where we could develop conclusions and
recommendations.
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
We recommend three follow-on research projects be
conducted on the TRICARE Demonstration Project.
1. A study which focuses on a cost-benefit analysis
of a contracted Service Center versus a military "in-house"
service center. The military service center would be
operated exclusively by the military medical services.
2. A study which focuses on the quality of care.
Has the quality of care improved with the introduction of
the TRICARE Project?
3. A study to determine the practicality of using
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